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ABSTRACT
Permits allowing qualified citizens to legally carry 
a concealed weapon ("CCWs") in public have become 
increasingly popular. Nevada adopted more lenient CCW 
standards in October of 1995, and an unprecedented number 
of legally armed citizens in the public has resulted. 
Supporters of CCWs claim the right to self-defense with 
less crime resulting. Critics claim more armed citizens 
will only produce more violence and crime.
To answer this debate, the following was conducted;
(1) a literature review of private firearm ownership, 
including CCWs, and crime, (2) an analysis based 
on Las Vegas' Uniform Crime Reports rates before and after 
adopting these more lenient CCW standards, and (3) a survey 
of recent Las Vegas CCW applicants.
This study failed to conclusively show that more CCWs 
increase or decrease crime. The CCW survey, however, 
suggested that most CCW applicants believe obtaining a 
CCW is an effective deterrent to crime.
I l l
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Permits allowing qualified citizens to carry a 
concealed weapon or firearm (here-after referred to as 
a "CCW") in public have become increasingly popular.
Led by special interest groups like the National Rifle 
Association, the number of states adopting more lenient 
uniform CCW provisions for its residents to more readily 
obtain these CCW permits has grown from nine in 1986, 
to 31 in 1996 (Knox 1996). Nevada adopted these more 
lenient uniform CCW standards in October of 1995, and 
a unprecedented number of armed citizens in the public 
has resulted (Vogel 1995).
Supporters of more armed CCW citizens claim the need 
and right of self-defense, and point to incidents such 
as that reported in the March 5, 1996 edition of the 
(Staunton, Virginia) Daily News Leader, where an armed 
CCW pedestrian was physically attacked by one of three 
convicted felons. "Suffering several blows, the man, a 
carry permit holder, drew his .45 and loosed [sic] eight
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
shots at his assailant, wounding him, stopping the attack 
and chasing off the other miscreants. The district 
attorney refused to press charges, saying, 'We believe 
he acted in total self defense. The concealed weapon kept 
this victim from being further injured.'"
Critics of the CCW concept claim more armed citizens 
on the streets will only result in more violence either 
by perpetrators now being forced to "shoot first" in 
committing their crimes, or from an armed CCW citizen 
over-reacting with lethal force in what starts out as 
little more than a minor altercation with another citizen.
The February 23, 1996 issue of USA Today describes such 
an incident where a traffic accident in Dallas, Texas 
escalated into a verbal argument in which subsequently, 
one driver began repeatedly punching the other, an armed 
CCW holder. The CCW driver responded by pulling out his 
.40 caliber handgun, and killing his antagonist. While 
the courts later exonerated the CCW owner on the basis 
of justifiable self-defense, Texas State Representative 
Harold Dutton is quoted, "If not for the (new Texas CCW) 
law, these families probably wouldn't be suffering today."
While the outcomes of these two examples are extreme, 
dramatic, and debatable, they are both founded in the basic 
hypothesis of more lenient CCW laws that this thesis will 
address, that being; "How does more lenient state CCW
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
laws and its resulting increase in armed citizens in the 
public, affect crime rates in Las Vegas?"
More armed citizens in the public could directly reduce 
crime through acts of self-defense, where an armed CCW 
owner foils an attempt by an assailant during the 
commission of a crime, or indirectly through deterrence, 
by increasing the level of real or perceived risk for the 
criminal to attempt a crime, as the CCW victim may be 
armed, and the non-CCW victim cannot be readily 
distinguished as such.
A reduction in crime attributable to more armed citizens 
in the public may result in displacement, where a 
corresponding increase in crime occurs in a neighboring 
community where there are less armed citizens in the 
public. Additionally, crimes possibly reduced by these 
new more lenient CCW laws (i.e. violent crimes) may be 
displaced by an increase in other types of crimes not 
involving direct victim contact (i.e. property crimes).
More armed citizens in the public could directly 
increase crime as these armed CCW citizens could decide 
to commit crimes themselves, as opportunities to use armed 
force present themselves. More armed citizens in the 
public could indirectly increase crime by increasing the 
level of real or perceived risk for a criminal to attempt 
a crime, as the CCW citizen may be armed, and the unarmed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
non-CCW citizen cannot be readily distinguished as such. 
Hence, the crimininal may now arm him/herself for 
protection to commit a crime, and may even adopt a "shoot 
the victim first" attitude. Finally, more armed citizens 
in the public may have no measurable positive or negative 
effect on crime in a given community.
In examining these possible effects of CCWs in Las 
Vegas, the following areas will be covered in this thesis; 
(1) a detailed overview of CCWs in general, (2) a review 
of key studies regarding firearms and crime in general, 
both from a theoretical basis and the current literature, 
including a review of published studies pertaining 
specifically to CCWs and crime, (3) an analysis of Las 
Vegas and other selected metropolitan cities regarding 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports 
(U.C.R.s) for crime rates before and after state CCW 
programs were initiated, (4) an analysis of new data from 
a survey of Nevada CCW applicants, and finally, (5) 
conclusions in attempting to integrate all of this 
information together.
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CHAPTER 2 
A GENERAL CCW OVERVIEW
A CCW may best be viewed as an extension of individual 
firearm ownership. While private firearm ownership is 
regulated by both federal and state/local law, it is not 
a prerequisite to have a CCW to own a handgun. A CCW is 
simply a permit issued under state law which allows a 
qualified firearm owner/resident to travel legally armed 
(weapon concealed on his/her person) in most public places 
within that particular state. Without a CCW, a citizen 
may be similarly armed only within the boundaries of 
his/her own premises or property. The lone exception to 
this is Vermont, which does not require its residents to 
have a CCW to carry a handgun concealed in most public 
settings throughout the state (Cramer and Kopel 1994).
On October 1, 1995, Nevada became the 27th state in 
adopting more uniform standards in issuing, or more 
specifically, in denying CCWs (Vogel 1995). These 
liberalized uniform standards changed the language of 
issuing CCWs from a "may issue" to a "shall issue" basis
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
and made it more difficult for the CCW issuing authorities 
to deny a requesting citizen a permit (Kime 1995).
Under the old "may issue" basis, most states allowing 
CCWs usually gave a local police chief, sheriff, or judge 
much discretionary power in issuing them, and they in turn 
typically granted them only on a "compelling need basis" 
such as a dangerous job or a threatened individual 
situation (Witkin 1994). Pro-gun advocates, however, 
claimed this system was abused, with only celebrities, 
politicians, and friends of the authorities arbitrarily 
receiving CCWs (Gottleib and Tartaro 1995). "From 1972 
to 1992, for instance, the Los Angeles police department 
awarded one civilian permit; to incoming police 
commissioner Willie Williams, before he was sworn in as 
an officer (Van Biema 1995:28)".
The city of Los Angeles was subsequently sued in the 
fall of 1992 for its discriminatory handling of the 
permits. Settled out of court before the trial, the city 
agreed to issue CCWs on a basis of need. In the nine 
months following the settlement, however, only five permits 
had been issued; three to government employees, and two 
to private attorneys (Cramer and Kopel 1994).
In Las Vegas, CCWs were tightly regulated by the county 
sheriff. With the election of current Clark County Sheriff 
Jerry Keller, the criteria for CCWs began to loosen in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
early 1995 with about 3,800 being issued under the old 
discretionary "may issue" criteria prior to the October 
1 "shall issue" statewide reforms (Vogel 1995). From 
January 1995 to July 1996, almost 10,000 CCWs had been 
issued in Nevada, with over 8,000 of these being in Clark 
County (Puit 1996).
As it now stands, for an administrative fee totaling 
$99.00, a requesting Nevada resident 21 years or older 
"shall be" issued a CCW valid for five years, within 120 
days from the Sheriff's department, providing a routine 
background check shows no outstanding warrants, conviction 
of a crime involving the use or threatened use of force 
or violence, conviction of any felony, domestic violence, 
stalking, restraining order, history of alcohol or 
substance abuse, or mental health problems. Additionally, 
the applicant must successfully complete an approved CCW 
instructional course, covering basic firearms use, safety, 
and proficiency, and legal/lethal force implications, 
prior to the permit being issued. These CCW courses are 
available from various sources throughout the state and 
range in cost from approximately $125 to 150 (LVMPD 
Concealed Firearms Q/A 1995).
These basic requirements are more or less similar in 
other "shall issue" states. Interestingly, Texas also 
requires as part of its CCW course, sessions in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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non-violent conflict resolution training; i.e. "I'm OK 
Your OK", "Getting in Touch with One's Inner Child", and 
the "LEAPS" method- Learning, Empathizing, Asking, 
Paraphrasing and Summarizing (Caroline 1996).
Thus, in a "shall issue" state like Nevada, specific 
guidelines are used in obtaining and issuing a CCW, and 
these guidelines are statewide in scope and uniformity. 
Because of this, the "pro" or "anti" discretionary power 
and attitude of the county sheriff or local administrator 
is bypassed in denying a permit to an individual by state 
law. The end result is generally more CCW applicants being 
approved in a "shall issue" state than a "may issue state".
While states issuing CCWs on a "shall issue" basis can 
be classified as more lenient in their criteria with any 
qualified resident desiring a permit being issued one, 
care should be taken not to automatically classify all 
"may issue" states as restrictive in issuing CCWs.
Depending on a "may issue" state's individual CCW 
authorities, permits could (but not likely) be issued as 
freely as in a "shall issue" state, or may be very 
restrictive, depending on the particular political climate. 
Likewise, a given "may issue" state may have one city or 
county with very restrictive CCW criteria, and a 
neighboring municipality with easier standards, all 
depending on the whims of the particular county sheriff
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
or local administrator. Colorado, for example, is a "may 
issue" state, and CCW has been used as a political 
football.
A group of Colorado women, organized as "SWARM" (Safety 
for Women and Responsible Motherhood, Inc.) have as their 
sole purpose, lobbying for reformed concealed carry 
provisions in that state (Tartaro 1995). El Paso County 
Sheriff John Anderson made good on a November campaign 
promise, and adopted the most lenient CCW standards in 
the state, and ran out of the 1,000 application forms he 
had available within the first 48 hours (Van Biema 1995). 
For comparison, in neighboring Denver, a total of only 
45 permits had been granted by Police Chief Ari Zavaras 
as of 1988 (Cramer and Kopel 1994).
Finally, a "may issue" state's criteria for issuing 
permits can change either direction with time. An example 
of this is the changes in Clark County previously 
mentioned.
Statistically, in "shall issue" states, approximately 
1 to 4% of the total population chooses to obtain a CCW 
permit (McNichol 1995, Cramer and Kopel 1994). A survey 
of CCW applicants in Texas found that 60% of applicants 
were crime victims, with 87% saying they were getting the 
permits to protect their families. A total of 97% owned 
a handgun prior to applying for their CCW. Additionally,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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85% owned a rifle and 83% a shotgun (American Rifleman 
1996). In Oklahoma, females accounted for 17% of all CCW 
applicants, and the major reason cited for wanting a CCW 
is personal safety (Ingraham 1996). Women constituted 
18.6% and 22.9% of CCWs in Washington and Oregon 
respectively (Lott and Mustard 1996).
Like them or not, more lenient CCWs have increased in 
popularity with "shall issue" states now numbering 31.
A list of all 31 "shall issue" CCW states is contained 
in the "Appendixes".
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CHAPTER 3 
LITERATURE REVIEW
While being issued a CCW is not a prerequisite to owning 
a firearm, a review beginning with the possible positive 
or negative effects on crime by private firearm ownership, 
and eventually leading to CCWs is appropriate, as this 
lays down a foundation from which we can focus from the 
general to the specific.
Numerous studies exist regarding the effectiveness of 
firearm use, in deterring crime, and specifically in 
self-defense. Other studies have addressed the related 
benefits and risks associated with firearm ownership.
Only four studies have been published examining CCWs and 
crime rates.
Unfortunately, the conclusions and findings of these 
studies are often in conflict with each other. For each 
study reporting a positive effect, another concludes with 
a negative finding, and vice versa. This should not be 
surprising given the controversial, emotional, and often 
political nature of private firearm ownership in our 
society today.
11
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MOTIVES FOR GÜN OWNERSHIP
Firearm ownership has been studied in part from several 
different perspectives, including religious affiliation 
(Little and Vogel 1992, Young 1989), culture (Kopel 1992, 
Bruce-Briggs 1976), regional "southern" subcultures 
(Ellison 1991, Dixon and Lizotte 1987), gender (Sheley, 
Brody, Wright, et al 1994), and personality attributes 
including sexual inadequacies (Diener and Kerber 1979).
A number of studies, have also addressed firearm ownership 
as a response to perceived crime.
Lizotte and Bordua (1980) for example, propose that 
not all legal firearm owners have the same motives for 
ownership. Those who hunt and target shoot often have 
as motives family tradition and socialization, while those 
who own primarily for protection do so as a reaction to 
perceived local violent crime. They also found violent 
attitudes and behavior not to be predictors of protective 
firearm ownership.
Smith and Uchida (1988) conclude that firearm ownership 
is a form of "self-help" that varies by owner depending 
on perceived vulnerability to crime. Accordingly, less 
perceived effectiveness of formal social control (i.e. 
the police), and less perceived informal social control 
of youth, results in increased private firearm ownership.
Young, McDowall and Loftin (1987) found protective
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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firearm ownership inversely related to confidence in the 
criminal justice system (the police and the courts), and 
this relationship is independent of demographic and 
socioeconomic variables and fear of crime.
Regardless of the exact motives for these households 
being armed, about 25-30% of all firearm owners do so 
primarily for self-defense or protection against crime 
(Wright 1984, Wright 1995, Kleck 1991, McDowall 1995), 
with women representing half of this number (Stange 1995). 
Additionally, 71% own firearms at least in part for 
protection (Kleck 1991). Finally, between 40 and 67% of 
handgun owners list protection as their main reason for 
ownership (Wright 1995, Kleck 1991).
Studies of why citizens decide to be armed in public 
places is limited. Bankston and Thompson (1989) however, 
found that the most direct influences for citizens carrying 
a gun for protection were: age, gender, and most important, 
the belief that the presence of a gun is an effective 
deterrent to crime.
Ironically, the principle reason criminals acquire and 
carry firearms (58%) is also for "self-protection" (Wright 
and Rossi 1986). The motive of "to use in my crimes" was 
mentioned only 28% of the time (Wright and Rossi 1986).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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THEORIES ON GDN OWNERSHIP 
AND DETERRENCE
Private firearm ownership can conceivably deter crime 
and victimization not only through acts of self-defense, 
but by also discouraging perpetrators from attempting 
crimes. Such a deterrent effect is supported by the 
classical school of criminology.
In the classical theory, victim selection is based on 
"the ease with which they can be victimized", and contends 
that "targets that pose...little resistance will be chosen 
over those with greater risks (Gottfredson and Hirschi 
1990:13) ."
In 1764, Cesare Beccaria, a founder of the classical 
school, wrote in. On Crimes and Punishment, that "Laws 
forbidding people to bear arms...only disarm those who 
are neither inclined nor determined to commit crimes... Such 
laws place the assaulted at a disadvantage and the 
assailant at an advantage, and they multiply rather than 
decrease the number of murders, since an unarmed person 
may be attacked with greater confidence than someone who 
is armed (1986:73)."
Thus, from this classical perspective, the criminal 
is more likely to victimize the unarmed as opposed to the 
armed, as criminal behavior is based on "a process of 
rationally calculated choice to achieve maximimum pleasure 
at the cost of minimimum pain (Pfohl 1985:63)."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Furthermore, the classical school proposes that deviance 
can be deterred through the use of calculated punishment, 
providing that this punishment meets the criteria of 
certainty, swiftness, and appropriate severity. This 
deterrence is both specific and general in nature, 
affecting both those criminals actually punished, and those 
who fear the possible punishment (Pfohl 1985). An armed 
potential victim, willing and capable of using lethal force 
in self-defense, can be viewed as possessing these 
necessary levels of certain, swift, and severe risk 
(possible punishment) to deter victimization by the 
rationally calculating assailant.
More modern victimization theories contain in part, 
this classical relationship of "increasing the risks to 
the criminals to reduce the criminal acts". The "routine 
activity" theory (Cohen and Felson 1979), for example, 
focuses on three key elements in the commission of a crime: 
motivated offenders, suitable targets, and the absence 
of capable guardians against a violation. These later 
two elements could be influenced by firearm ownership, 
and the lack of any of these elements should diminish 
victimization.
The "structural-choice" theory of victimization in part 
proposes that "the subjective value of a person or object 
and its level of guardianship determines the choice of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the particular crime target (Meier and Miethe 1993:475)". 
"Guardianship" in this theory is divided into both "social 
and physical" subgroups, with physical guardianship 
including the ownership of firearms. "Regardless of its 
particular form, the availability of capable guardianship 
is deemed important because it indicates increased 'costs' 
to would-be offenders...and thus should decrease 
opportunity for victimization (Meier and Miethe 1993:483)".
Some theories, however, propose that firearm ownership 
may serve as a stimulus to aggression, and elicit violent 
and sometimes assaultive behavior by firearm owners or 
any who may come in contact with the owners of the firearm 
itself.
Berkowitz (1968), for example, conducted a series of 
controlled experiments to measure a "weapons effect", where 
the mere presence of a firearm may result in more 
aggressive behavior from otherwise benevolent people, that 
would not have ordinarily occurred. Typically, children 
given toy guns to play with were later observed displaying 
more antisocial behavior than children with non-gun toys 
(Berkowitz 1968), drivers were noted to honk their horns 
more often (i.e. more aggression) at a stalled pickup truck 
with a rifle racked visibly in its cab's rear window, than 
in a "unarmed" truck (Berkowitz 1981). In effect, more 
firearms results in more aggression from all involved.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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armed or not.
While some other experimental studies (Frodi 1973, 
Leyens and Parke 1975, Page and O'Neal 1977), support this 
"weapons effect" theory, other experimental studies do 
not. Turner, Layton and Simons (1975) and Fraczek and 
Macaulay (1971) found the presence of a firearm to have 
an inhibiting effect on aggressive behavior from their 
experimental studies, as the potentially assaultive people 
feared the possiblity of being shot if they exhibited 
aggression to their armed victims.
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON GUN OWNERSHIP 
AND DETERRENCE
Analysis of existing crime rate data has been used to 
propose a deterrent effect of firearm ownership on 
different types of crimes. Kleck (1991) found that 
countries such as Great Britain and the Netherlands, which 
have significantly lower private firearm ownership than 
the United States, have a significantly higher rate of 
burglaries of occupied residences. Witkin (1994) cites 
an analysis from the 1979-87 National Crime Survey which 
found only a 14% successful burglary rate against occupied 
armed homes verses a 33% rate for occupied homes as a 
whole.
Other studies have found that firearm ownership can 
often inhibit or deter violent crime. Kleck and McElrath
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(1991:669) analyzed data on violent incidents among 
strangers, taken from the 1979-85 National Crime Surveys 
and the 1982 Supplementary Homicide Reports, and found 
that "firearms, appear to inhibit attack".
Robin (1991), analyzed data from the Orlando, Florida 
rape study and found that firearm ownership provides a 
general deterrent effect. After the city's rape rate 
tripled from 1965 to 1966, the Orlando Police Department 
offered a highly media publicized handgun self-defense 
program that was completed by 6,00 0 women from October 
1966 to April 1967. Based on U.C.R. data analysis for 
the following year, Orlando's rape rate dropped almost 
9 0%, despite actual handgun ownership not increasing, nor 
any data documenting a firearm actually being used in 
self-defense against an attempted rape.
Other studies, however, have found firearm ownership 
to be no real deterrent to victimization, or to increase 
the chance of death to the owner. Green (1987) for 
example, in examining the previously mentioned Orlando 
rape study's U.C.R. data (expanded to 1964-69 in this 
study's analysis), found an effect of displacement, not 
deterrence. Specifically, rape decreased 60.7% in 
Orlando, but increased 60.5% in surrounding non-Orlando 
areas.
Other studies have found firearm ownership not to deter
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crime, but to instead, be associated with higher rates 
of suicide and homicide. Kellermann, Rivera, Rushforth, 
et al (1993) for example, studied homicides in the home 
in Memphis, Cleveland, and Seattle over a five year 
period. Compared to a control group of nonhomicide homes, 
those with guns are three times more likely to be the 
scene of a homicide than comparable homes without guns.
Loftin, McDowall, and Wiersema (1991) examined the 
impact of restricting handgun ownership in Washington 
D.C.. Their findings were that restrictive handgun 
legislation resulted in an immediate, abrupt decline in 
gun suicides and homicides, without an increase in non-gun 
suicides and homicides.
Studies supporting and not supporting firearm ownership 
and deterrence have their limitations. Those suggesting 
a deterrent effect often cannot clearly attribute 
decreases in crime rates specifically and solely to 
firearms ownership (i.e. is private firearm ownership 
the sole deterrent to a buglary, or are homeowners who 
own firearms for protection also more likely to have home 
security alarm systems, better quality door and window 
locks, and to have taken other precautions to "harden" 
their homes from victimization as opposed to non-gun 
homeowners?). On the other hand, studies suggesting that 
private firearm ownership results in increased rates of
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homicides and suicides seem at odds with other studies 
contending that the same behavior would still occur, at 
the same high rates, but only by other means and methods 
(Wright and Rossi 1986, Kopel 1993, and Leenaars and 
Lester 1994).
Another way of examining for a possible deterrent 
effect of firearm ownership would be from the criminal's 
perspective, through the use of surveys, for if a true 
deterrent effect of firearms ownership does exist, it 
would be the criminal perpetrator who would experience 
it. Surveys of convicted felons suggest a deterrence 
effect from armed citizens. For example, Erickson and 
Stenseth (1996:61) polled 310 armed store robbers 
incarcerated in twenty state prisons, and found that among 
a list of effective deterrents, "three of the top six had 
to do with armed opposition".
Wright and Rossi (1986), conducted a national survey 
of over 1,600 incarcerated felons regarding victim 
selection. "Generally speaking, felons from states with 
more gun owners worried proportionally more about 'armed 
victim' encounters than did felons in other states 
(1986:154)" and that while it may be difficult for the 
criminal to assess whether a potential victim is armed 
or not, "criminals are no more anxious to encounter armed 
victims than victims are to encounter armed criminals
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(1986:144)". Additional findings from this comprehensive 
study (1986:146) were;
1) 81% felt the "smart criminal" should try to find 
out if a potential victim is armed.
2) 74% who committed burglaries avoided occupied 
buildings for among other reasons, fear of being 
shot.
3) 40% did not commit a specific crime for fear that 
the victim was armed.
4) 34% said they had been scared off, wounded, or 
captured at least once by an armed citizen.
5) 57% felt the typical criminal had a greater fear 
of the armed citizen, than running into the police.
Kleck (1988) may offer an explanation for this last 
survey attitude by estimating that over three times more 
felons are killed annually in "excusable self-defense" 
or "justifiable" shootings by civilians, as opposed to 
the police. Specifically, "about 1500-2800 felons were 
killed by gun-wielding civilians in self-defense or some 
other legally justified cause in 1980 (Kleck 1991:113)" 
and "between 8700 and 16,600 nonfatal, legally permissible 
woundings of criminals by gun-armed civilians in 1980 
(Kleck 1991:116)". Additionally, Snyder (1993) cites only 
2% of civilian shootings involving an innocent person 
mistakenly identified as a criminal, while the error rate 
for the police is 11%.
Conversely, Wright and Rossi (1986) also found that
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among these incarcerated felons surveyed, concern of 
confronting an armed citizen was a primary reason for 
deciding to carry a weapon themselves.
There are, however, limitations of these criminal 
surveys in determining the deterrent effect of armed 
citizens. First, incarcerated criminal surveys may 
reflect attitudes that may differ from those of criminals 
who have successfully avoided apprehension. Secondly, 
some have cautioned against interpreting these surveys 
as meaning that armed citizens will truly deter criminals 
from committing crimes altogether. Green (1987:71) has 
stated that "the only inference one can take from these 
results, it seems, is that potential criminals avoid 
crimes against victims perceived to be armed and attack 
those perceived as unarmed, which would indicate crime 
displacement rather than crime deterrence".
Green (1987) acknowledges that an armed victim may 
indeed successfully foil a criminal attempt (an act of 
self-defense), but questions whether the very thought of 
an armed society as a whole has any true effect on 
inhibiting a criminal from committing a crime for fear 
of being shot by any random potential victim (general 
deterrence).
In conclusion, some studies have supported the theory 
of private firearm ownership deterring crime, while others
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have not supported it, by showing evidence of either 
displacement, or increases in crime rates.
DEFENSIVE OSES OF FIREARMS
How often firearms are used in acts of self-defense, 
and how effective they are has been analyzed in a number 
of studies. Consensus, however, cannot be reached.
Self-defensive acts involving firearms in the United 
States range from annual estimates of 64,615 (McDowall 
and Wiersema 1994) to 2.2-2.5 million (Kleck and Gertz
1995), with over 400,000 of this later estimate being 
life saving in nature. Numerous other studies and surveys 
estimate annual defensive gun use rates in the United 
States somewhere between these two figures; 764,036 
(Tarrance 1994), 1,098.409 (DMI, 1978), and 1,487,342
(Mauser 1990). Hart (1981) estimates 1,797,461 annual 
defensive uses involving only handguns.
Approximately 3% of the United States population is 
a victim of a violent crime annually (Kleck 1991). The 
incidence of defensive firearm use range from .09% 
annually per U.S. household according to the 1992 National 
Crime Victimization Survey, to 1.3% annually and 3.3% over 
a 5 year recall period per surveyed adults (Kleck and 
Gertz 1995). Estimates from other studies include; .18 
annually per total crime victims, and .83% per violent
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crime victims (McDowall and Wiersema 1994), 1-2% over a 
5 year recall period per surveyed adults (Tarrance 1994), 
3.6% over a lifetime recall period per surveyed adults 
(Gallop 1993), 3.8% over a 5 year recall period per 
surveyed adults (Mauser 1990), 3% for handguns in defense 
of burglaries only by adults (Trisch 1993), 4% involving 
handguns only over a 5 year recall period per surveyed 
adults (Hart 1981), and 7% during a lifetime recall period 
per surveyed adults (DMI 1978).
Studies designed to measure defensive firearm use 
among firearm owners surveyed cite incident rates of 11.8% 
at least once in their lives (Gallop 1995) and 9-16% for 
a lifetime recall period (Time/CNN 1989). Additionally, 
the Nevada Policy Research Institute cites a Psychology 
Today study which reported that 81% of good Samaritans 
who came to the aid of violent crime victims, were gun 
owners who carried their guns in their cars or on their 
persons (NPRI 1996).
Kleck and Gertz (1995) have noted a number of
limitations which could result in some surveys
underestimating defensive gun use. For example, the 1992 
NCVS (on which the 1994 McDowall study is based) was not
designed to measure rates of defensive firearm use, but
to measure victimization. It did not contain a direct 
question on self-defense with a firearm, but only general
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questions on whether anything was done for protection. 
Thus, those surveyed had to volunteer any information 
regarding defensive firearm use. As these questions were 
administered by representatives of the federal government 
without anonymity for those surveyed, candid reponses may 
have been inhibited given the subject matter of a 
defensive shooting. Additionally, other surveys may not 
allow for measurement of more than one defensive gun use 
per individual or household surveyed, or may use long 
recall periods which could contribute to memory loss.
Another limitation which could result in an 
undercounting of defensive gun use is assuming that all 
gun owners own guns for the same purpose. As opposed to 
hunters, target shooters, collectors, and others like 
them, only 10% of all adults and 30% of gun owners list 
self-defense as their major reason for owning a gun 
(McDowall 1995), and only 10% of gun owners store their 
guns loaded and accessible some or all of the time 
(Nelson, Grant, Powell 1996).
Others, however, question the accuracy of the higher 
defensive gun use estimates, due to these surveys' 
definitions, or lack of definitions of "self-defense".
"An awful lot of what some people would call self-defense 
is, like, somebody asks you for a quarter and you tell 
them to get lost, but as you walk away you keep your hand
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on your gun" says Philip Cook, a Duke University economist 
(Guter 1996:89). In addition, many incidents that people 
report as self-defense may in fact be assaults, in which 
the respondent takes a more active role than he admits.
"In many instances, we may only be talking to one side 
of an argument,' says Zimring (Guter 1996:89)."
Some studies have examined firearms being used for 
self-defense on the basis of "risk-benefit" ratios. 
Kellermann, Rivera and Rushforth (1993:1084) found that 
homes with guns are three times more likely to be the 
scene of a homicide than comparable homes without guns, 
and conclude that "the risks of having a gun in the home 
substantially outweigh the benefits...people should be 
strongly discouraged from keeping guns in their homes". 
Kellermann and Reay (1986) found that a gun kept in the 
house is approximately 4 3 times more likely to kill a 
family member or friend than an intruder. Other studies, 
however, have found that the vast majority of defensive 
firearm uses are not lethal in outcome, and predominately 
involves not firing and scaring the criminal off, holding 
him/her at bay until arrival of the police, firing and 
missing the assailant, or nonfatally wounding him/her. 
"Well under 1 % of defensive gun uses involve a criminal 
being killed (Kleck 1991:129)". Estimates of victims even 
firing their weapons, range from 24 to 28% (Kleck and
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Gertz 1995, McDowall and Wiersema 1994). Snyder (1993) 
found citizens merely brandishing their weapons or firing 
a warning shot 98% of the time.
Finally, some studies have found that for some crimes, 
any type of resistance is ill advised. Wright, Rossi and 
Daly (1983:141) state that "for the types of crimes in 
question (mainly, home burglary, against occupied 
residences, home robberies, and aggravated assaults), the 
evidence also suggests that one is more likely to be 
injured or killed if one resists the offender in any way 
(whether with a weapon or with some other protective 
action) than if one merely capitulates".
Other studies find resistance with firearms to result 
in less injury for the victim than capitulation or 
resistance with other methods. Kleck and McElrath 
(1991:669) for example, found that "deadly weapons, 
including firearms appear to inhibit attack, and in the 
case of attack, to reduce the probability of injury...the 
overall net effect of the availability of guns on the 
probability of the victim's death is very close to zero". 
McDowall (1995) found that although firearm defense is 
rare, it is often successful when it does occur, and 
firearm owners who employ their use were less likely to 
suffer serious injury, and more likely to report that the 
offender had failed to complete the crime.
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In summary, there is no consensus regarding the 
effectiveness of firearms for self-defense. Studies have 
found firearms for self-defense to be used with various 
degrees of frequency and effectiveness, and with various 
degrees of risks and benefits.
GUN AVAILABILITY, DENSITY AND CRIME
The United States is the most heavily armed industrial 
nation in the world with recent estimates of privately 
owned firearms ranging from 150 million (Robin 1991:) to 
approximately 200 million (Wright 1995, Kleck 1991) to 
over 231 million (Kates et al 1995). Handguns account 
for between 50-65 million (Robin 1991) to over 82 million 
of these totals (Kates et al 1995).
T h is  r e p r e s e n t s  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  h a l f  o f  a l l  A m e r ic a n  
h o u s e h o ld s  b e i n g  l e g a l l y  a rm e d  ( K a t e s  1984, K le c k  1991,
R o b in  1991, K o p e l  1992), a n d  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  o n e  o u t  o f  
e v e r y  f o u r  h a v i n g  a  h a n d g u n  ( R o b in  1991). G iv e n  t h i s  
p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e l y  o w n e d  f i r e a r m s  i n  o u r  c o u n t r y ,  
m any s t u d i e s  e x i s t  w h ic h  f i n d  a d v e r s e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  t h e  
a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  f i r e a r m s  a n d  c r im e  r a t e s .
Newton and Zimring (1970) and Zimring (1991) conclude 
that more firearms in circulation ("gun density") correlates 
with more gun-related crimes and deaths. For example, 
in examining death rates during robberies in Detroit,
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Zimring (1977:317) stated, "any countermeasure that 
succeeded in reducing gun availability in robbery appears 
to likely to reduce both the number of robberies and the 
death rate per thousand robberies".
Zimring is quoted, "Guns escalate conflict into, lethal 
violence. If everyone were armed...an attacker would have 
to assume that the victim is armed, so he'd carry more 
lethal weapons and use them earlier...If there's a subway 
full of .38s, what happens when someone's ghetto blaster 
is too loud? (Adler 1990:82)".
Other studies support the gun density relationship to 
increased levels of homicides and suicides, homicides, 
and fatal firearm accidents (Loftin et al 1991, McDowall 
1991, and McDowall and Loftin 1985).
The Loftin et al (1991) study additionally supported 
the Zimring-Cook "weapon-choice" theory that proposes that 
violent acts differ and vary with respect to intent to 
kill. Specifically, while some violent acts are highly 
motivated and focused in violent determination, others 
are relatively weak in resolve and short lived. In these 
later cases, the frequency in which a particular type of 
weapon will be used is influenced by its availability. 
Hence, while some people will select guns because they 
are determined to kill, and firearms are more lethal than 
other weapons that may be substituted for them, other
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people will select firearms only because they are readily 
available.
Others, however, propose that gun density is due to 
"reverse causation", that is, where people feel most 
vulnerable to crime is where firearm ownership may most 
dense, and that firearm ownership is simply a rational 
response to the threat of crime (Kleck 1991, Polsby 1994), 
or conclude that homicide and suicide rates will remain 
the same, despite firearm restrictions due to 
substitution of other weapons and methods (Wright and 
Rossi 1986, Kopel 1992, Kopel 1993, Leenaars and Lester
1994).
Kates, Schaffer, and Lattimer (1995) found gun density 
to have no effect on homicide rates. Analyzing data over 
a twenty year period from 1973 to 1992, they found: the 
number of firearms in the U.S. had increased from 
122,304,980 to 221,851,212, the homicide rate remained 
about the same, 9.4 and 9.3 per 100,000 population, and 
the percentage of homicides committed by guns remained 
about the same, 68.5% and 68.2% respectively. Moderate 
fluctuations in homicide rates and gun homicide rates were 
noted over the years studied, but nothing that could be 
correlated to the strong progressive increase in the number 
of guns itself.
Some studies have found higher gun density to reduce
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crime. Toch and Lizotte (1992:234) state that "national 
patterns show little violent crime where guns are most 
dense implies that guns do not elicit aggression in any 
meaningful way. Quite to the contrary, these findings 
suggest that high saturations of guns in places, or 
something correlated with that condition, inhibit illegal 
aggression". Thornberry (1995:18) correlates legal 
firearm ownership with less juvenile crime due to the 
recreational use (socialization via hunting or target 
shooting) of firearms by the juvenile's family as a whole. 
Specifically, as opposed to boys who illegally own 
firearms, "boys who own legal firearms, however, have much 
lower rates of delinquency and drug use and are even 
slightly less delinquent than nonowners of guns".
History may offer a mixed, ironic twist to the gun 
density concept. Cramer and Kopel (1994) cite old west 
historian Roger McGrath's detailed study of the nineteenth 
century mining towns of Aurora and Bodie in the Sierra 
Nevadas. The population was heavily influenced by young 
transients who worked in the mines. Saloons, brothels 
and gambling halls were common, popular hang-outs for 
many of these young miners, who often got into drunken 
brawls at them. Local law enforcement was ineffective 
and often corrupt, and as such, almost everyone carried 
a gun for protection. The homicide rates in these two
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towns were high, in some cases exceeding that of modern 
Washington D.C.. However, almost all of these shootings 
and killings were limited to saloon shootings between the 
young drunken miners when one of their arguments had 
escalated out of control. The more "respectable" part 
of Aurora and Bodie's population, who spent little of their 
time "drinking and fighting with each other", were subject 
to almost no crime or victimizations. Robbery, burglary 
(7% and 1% the rate of modern New York respectively), and 
rape were rare events. "Respectable" women and girls were 
almost never accosted or insulted in any manner. This 
in part was due to a nineteenth century respect depravity 
paid decency, but also in part to the knowledge that sudden 
death would follow any other course.
In summary, some studies support the relationship of 
gun density and increased crime rates, while other studies 
do not support it, or find a beneficial decrease in crime 
rates due to increased gun density.
STUDIES ON CCWs AND CRIME
Unlike the numerous studies on firearm ownership in 
general and its possible positive or negative effects on 
crime, studies specifically dealing with CCWs and crime 
are relatively limited. Only four studies have been 
published, all recently, regarding the effects of easing
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CCW la w s  a n d  t h e i r  im p a c t  o n  c r im e  r a t e s .  L i k e  t h e  g e n e r a l  
f i r e a r m  o w n e r s h ip  s t u d i e s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e s e  s t u d i e s  a r e  a ls o  
o f t e n  i n  c o n f l i c t  r e g a r d i n g  t h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n s .
Cramer and Kopel (1994:8-40) analyzed homicide rates 
for ten CCW states versus the nation for each year from 
1959 to 1992. The ten states and the year of their 
adopting "shall issue" or more lenient CCW criteria were; 
Washington (1961), Florida (1987), Virginia (1988), Georgia 
(1989), Pennsylvania (1989), Oregon (1989), West Virginia 
(1989), Idaho (1990), Montana (1991), and Mississippi 
(1991 ) .
Cramer and Kopel's findings (1994) were inconclusive 
for Washington, West Virginia, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, 
and Mississippi. Carry reform appears to have reduced 
homicide rates in Florida and Georgia, but to have not 
been effective in Virginia. In Pennsylvania, CCW reform 
may have been beneficial in Philadelphia, and apparently 
has resulted in no harm outside of Philadelphia. "In 
neither large or small states do we see evidence of obvious 
long-term increases in murder rates after passage of the 
laws..homicide rates will not increase as a result of 
crimes committed by persons with carry permits. Carry 
reform legislation may or may not reduce the homicide rate, 
but reform legislation clearly does not raise the homicide 
rate (1 994 : 39-40)."
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 4
Cramer and Kopel (1994) also compared the number of 
CCWs issued and crime rates for different counties in 
California, a "may issue" state where CCW issuing criteria 
varies widely. Using 1989 data, California's 58 counties 
were divided into three groups depending on the prevalence 
of CCW ownership; 19 counties with less than .1% of its 
total population having CCWs, 22 counties having between 
.1% and 1% CCW ownership, and 17 counties with more than 
1 % of its population owning a CCW.
Comparing the crime rates for "highly restrictive CCW 
counties" to "moderately restrictive CCW counties" to 
"non-restrictive CCW counties", Cramer and Kopel (1994) 
found generally less aggravated assault, homicide, rape, 
and robbery to occur as the level of CCWs in the counties 
increased.
Limitations to Cramer and Kopel's 1994 California 
analysis include the fact that the 19 "highly restrictive 
CCW/higher crime rate" counties are predominantly urban, 
while the 17 "nonrestrictive CCW/lower crime rate" counties 
are predominantly rural, thus leaving open the possibility 
that several factors other than CCWs could account for 
the crime rate differences.
The third published study on CCWs and their effects 
on crime rates (McDowall, Loftin and Wiersema 1995), 
examined the impact of more lenient CCWs and firearm
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3 5
homicide rates in Miami, Tampa, and Jacksonville, Florida 
("shall issue" CCWs since October 1987), Jackson, 
Mississippi ("shall issue" CCWs since July 1990), and 
Portland, Oregon ("shall issue" CCWs since January 1990), 
by examining U.C.R- data for these cities before and after 
the "shall issue" laws went into effect. Tampa and 
Jacksonville were analyzed for 177 months before the "shall 
issue" law, and 63 after it. Miami was analyzed 120 months 
before and 63 months after, Jackson 210 months before and 
30 months after, and Portland 204 months before and 36 
months after.
Firearm homicides were used as the measurement of CCWs ' 
effect on crime rates, as this study's design is based 
in part, on the findings of Wright and Rossi (criminals 
may carry firearms themselves, and use them, in response 
to their victim being armed), and Zimring and Cook 
(assaults are often impulsive acts involving the most 
readily available weapons, hence more firearm carriers, 
legal or illegal, may result in more homicides).
This study produced two conclusions, one stronger than 
the other, from their analyzed U.C.R. data. The first, 
and stronger conclusion, is that more lenient CCWs "do 
not reduce homicides, at least in large urban areas".
The second, conclusion, is that more lenient CCWs may in 
fact "raise levels of firearms murders. Coupled with a
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lack of influence on murders by other means, the laws 
thus increase the frequency of homicide (1995:203)". 
Specifically, McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema found gun 
homicides increased an average of 26%, with Miami plus 
3%, Jacksonville plus 75%, Tampa plus 22%, Portland 
minus 12%, and Jackson plus 43%. Non-gun homicides 
decreased an average of .2%, with Miami minus 8%, 
Jacksonville plus 36%, Tampa plus 17%, Portland minus 24%, 
and Jackson minus 22% (1995:205).
Possible limitations to McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema's 
study includes the selection of the Florida cities studied, 
and restricting the impact of "shall issue" CCWs by 
analyzing gun-homicides only. Specifically, while gun 
homicides increased in the three Florida cities studied, 
and non-gun homicides increased in two of the three Florida 
cities studied, the total homicide rate for the state of 
Florida decreased every year after the state's "shall 
issue" law went into effect, thus suggesting that the 
results in the three cities studied may not be 
representative of the entire state (Polsby 1995a).
Interestingly, while the McDowall, Loftin and Wiersema 
study's gun homicide analysis tested and supported the 
Zimring and Cook gun density concept, some parts of the 
paper did not support it, as few CCW owners misused their 
guns to commit crimes (McDowall, Loftin, and Wiersema
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1995). Other sources also reflect this rare "abuse"
of CCWs. A 1995 fax from the Florida Division of Licensing 
(see copy in "Appendixes") shows 285,641 CCWs being issued 
from October 1987 to May 1995, with only 48, or less than 
.02%, being revoked due to the CCW holder using a firearm 
to commit a crime. A Nexus search could not find "a single 
case, anywhere in the country, of someone who was legally 
carrying a concealed handgun using that weapon in a 
criminal homicide (Polsby 1995b:215)", nor could Nevada 
law enforcement officials recall a fatal shooting occurring 
under similar circumstances in the state (Puit and Flanagan
1996).
The fourth and latest study to examine CCWs and their 
effects on crime rates, Lott and Mustard (1997), based 
their cross-sectional time-series analysis on U.C.R. data 
for each of the nation's 3,054 counties from 1977 to 1992, 
and additional data on conviction rates, sentence lengths, 
and CCW permits per county from every state's department 
of corrections. State Attorney Generals, State Secretary 
of State, and State Police offices.
T h e i r  c o n c l u s i o n s  a r e  t h a t  a l l o w i n g  q u a l i f i e d  c i t i z e n s  
t o  l e g a l l y  c a r r y  c o n c e a le d  w e a p o n s  d e t e r s  v i o l e n t  c r im e  
a n d  a p p e a r s  t o  p r o d u c e  no i n c r e a s e  i n  a c c i d e n t a l  d e a t h s .
The deterrent effect of CCWs is most pronounced in the 
highest crime counties. It was also found that criminals
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substituted violent crimes with an increase in property 
crimes which involve minimal criminal-victim contact, and 
this displacement of crime is most noted in the largest 
population counties.
Specifically, Lott and Mustard (1997) found that when 
a state's concealed handgun laws went into effect in a 
county, murders fell by 8.5 percent, and rapes and 
aggravated assaults fell by 5 and 7 percent, on average. 
Using derived coefficients, Lott and Mustard concluded 
that if states without "shall issue" CCW laws had adopted 
them in 1992, approximately 1,570 murders, 4,177 rapes, 
60,363 aggravated assaults, and 11,898 robberies would 
have been avoided that year. Conversely, there would have 
been 247,165 more property crimes in 1992 (a 2.7% 
increase). Finally, this study estimates the financial 
gain from allowing CCWs to be over $6,214 billion in 1992 
dollars ($6.6 billion in savings from reduced violent 
crimes minus $417 million from increased property crimes), 
based on National Institute of Justice estimates on what 
different types of crimes "cost" society.
Limitations to Lott and Mustard's CCW study include 
questions regarding the study's problematic values assigned 
to counties whose U.C.R. data was missing or not reported. 
Additionally, Florida's U.C.R. data in itself, may have 
skewed the entire study's analysis towards its "CCW-crime
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deterrence" conclusion, as some critics claim CCW's 
reduction on crime to have been significant only in 
Florida, and insignificant in every other CCW state.
In summary, four studies have been published regarding 
the possible effects of more lenient CCW laws on various 
crime rates, and all four have varying conclusions. The 
first study found more lenient CCW laws may or may not 
reduce homicide rates, but definitely will not increase 
the rates. The second study found the greater the 
prevalence of CCW ownership, the less the violent crime 
rate. The third study found that more lenient CCW laws 
do not decrease certain homicides, and may actually 
increase their rate. Finally, the fourth study found more 
lenient CCW laws result in a decrease in violent crimes, 
with criminal activity displaced by an increase in property 
crimes.
LITERATURE REVIEW CONCLUSIONS
Published studies regarding private firearm ownership 
and CCWs and their possible effects on crime rates have 
been reviewed from several different aspects. Theories 
and empirical studies regarding deterrence, self-defense, 
motives for ownership, and density have individually and 
collectively yielded no consensus. For each study finding 
a positive or negative effect on crime, another exists 
with conflicting or neutral findings.
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES & QUESTIONS
The previous Literature review showed a multitude of 
studies that addressed private legal firearm ownership 
and CCWs, and their various possible relationships to crime 
and victimization. These studies have viewed firearm 
ownership or CCWs as an independent variable that may 
positively or negatively effect crime or victimization, 
which is the dependent variable.
Some studies show that armed citizens routinely use 
firearms in numerous acts of self-defense and directly 
thwart their assailants during attempted criminal acts. 
These studies suggest that more armed citizens will result 
in less crimes successfully completed.
Other studies show that armed citizens deter crime by 
having increased their level of real or perceived physical 
guardianship, and thus make themselves less attractive 
or vulnerable to the "rational decision-making" criminal. 
These studies suggest that more armed citizens inhibit 
or deter criminals, and thus will result in less crimes
40
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attempted.
However, some studies show that armed citizens only 
displace criminal activity to those citizens who are 
unarmed, or to those types of crimes that involve minimal 
or no victim contact. These studies suggest that more 
armed citizens will result in less crime in the armed 
community, but higher crime in a neighboring unarmed 
community, or less violent crimes, but more property 
crimes.
Conversely, some studies have found that more armed 
citizens increase crime as greater gun density results 
in more criminal acts among the citizens themselves.
Still other studies suggest that more armed citizens 
or the perception of more armed citizens will increase 
crime as criminals will now arm themselves for "protection' 
and may even adopt a "shoot first" attitude.
In short, within all of the studies reviewed, CCWs can 
be viewed as resulting in more real or perceived armed 
citizens in public settings, and along with it, any 
resulting positive or negative, direct or indirect effects 
on different crimes. Accordingly, the following research 
hypothesis will be evaluated in the current study;
"More CCWs will influence crime rates in Las Vegas"
In evaluating this hypothesis, a number of other
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research questions derived from the past literature review 
must also be addressed. These include the types of crimes 
affected by CCWs, the reasons why these crime rates are 
affected by CCWs, and the nature and magnitude of 
displacement. For example, if more CCWs decrease crime, 
which crimes are decreased, and how are they decreased, 
by increased acts of self-defense, by increased deterrence, 
or by a combination of these two avenues? Additionally, 
if more CCWs decrease certain crimes, will displacement 
occur where other crimes increase, or will the same 
crimes increase in non-CCW communities? Alternatively, 
if more CCWs increase crime, which crimes are increased, 
and how are they increased, by CCW owners committing crimes 
themselves, by more criminals arming themselves in response 
to their perception of CCW citizens, or by a combination 
of these two avenues? Also, if more CCWs increase certain 
crimes, will displacement occur where certain other crimes 
decrease? Finally, do more CCWs provide any benefits or 
risks other than a possible decrease or increase in certain 
crimes? These questions will be addressed as part of this 
study's analysis.
Some of the previously reviewed studies do not support 
either the possible benefits of firearm ownership (i.e. 
firearm use for self-defense, a firearm deterrent effect, 
etc.), or the possible risks of firearm ownership (i.e.
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"gun density", "weapons effect", etc.). These studies 
would in part help support a null hypothesis in finding 
that CCWs have no measurable effect on crime rates.
The results of data analysis directed at evaluating 
the impact of CCW ownership and crime rates is discussed 
in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 5
METHODOLOGY
To determine if Nevada's new CCW law has had any effect 
on crime rates in Las Vegas, data from the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation's U.C.R.s were analyzed for Las Vegas, 
and 24 other "shall issue" cities, which served as 
"controls". Any crime-increasing or crime-decreasing 
change in these cities, after initiation of their new CCW 
law, would support the hypothesis that "more CCWs will 
influence crime rates."
This analysis was two fold. First, Las Vegas and the 
24 "shall issue" CCW control cities were each examined 
comparing a five year average of their annual U.C.R. 
"violent crime" rates before adoption of their new CCW 
criteria versus a violent crime rate average after 
adoption. This post-CCW violent crime rate average was 
based on one to five years of annual U.C.R. data, depending 
on when a city's individual state adopted "shall issue" 
criteria. Hence, Las Vegas ("shall issue" since 1995) 
would have a post-CCW violent crime average based on one
44
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year, while Nashville's ("shall issue" since 1994) average 
would be based on two years data, Atlanta ("shall issue" 
since 1989) would be based the maximum five years data 
(1989-1994), etc.. Multi-year averages of each city's 
pre and post-CCW violent crime rates were used in this 
analysis due to many of the cities not having reported 
data in the U.C.R. for a particular year/years. This first 
phase analysis gives a general idea of whether more lenient 
CCW laws resulted in more or less violent crime in Las 
Vegas and its control "shall issue" cities.
The second phase of this analysis was a more detailed 
analysis of U.C.R. crime rates, involving Las Vegas and 
five of the 24 "shall issue" cities previously examined. 
These five "control" cities were selected on the following 
basis: (1) having no missing or incomplete annual U.C.R.
data, (2) having at least two years post-CCW data, and 
(3) having some similarity to Las Vegas in respect to size, 
urbanization, and economy. This analysis entailed, 
comparisons of crime rates in Las Vegas and each of the 
five control cities on an annual basis starting five years 
pre-CCW, and ending one to five years post-CCW, depending 
on when each city's individual state adopted their CCW 
law. Separately examined in this analysis were the violent 
crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated assaults, 
and the property crimes of burglary and motor vehicle
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theft. As opposed to the first phase of analysis involving 
24 control cities and violent crime rate averages, this 
second phase of analysis: (1) examined specific types of 
crimes, so it could be determined if the more lenient CCW 
laws affect certain crimes and not others, (2) better 
isolated Las Vegas' CCW status as possibly affecting 
crime rates, as the control cities now have similarities 
to Las Vegas' size, urbanization, and economy, and (3) 
examined Las Vegas and its control cities annually over 
a period of several years, so any pre-existing (i.e. a 
pre-CCW) crime increase or decrease trend could be 
detected, thus suggesting any post-CCW crime rate change 
may be a continuance from a separate influence from the 
"shall issue" CCW law itself.
In effect, the total analysis for this study started 
with a general analysis of violent crime rate averages, 
pre-CCW versus post-CCW, involving Las Vegas with 24 other 
"shall issue" cities serving as "controls", and then led 
to a more detailed analysis of specific violent and 
property crimes on an annual basis pre and post-CCW, for 
Las Vegas and five selected control cities. Taken together, 
a clearer picture should emerge of whether more CCWs in 
Las Vegas influence crime rates in any way.
Finally, a survey was administered to Las Vegas area 
CCW applicants who had successfully completed their CCW
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q u a l i f i c a t i o n  c o u r s e .  T h e  r e s p o n s e s  c o l l e c t e d  f r o m  t h i s  
s u r v e y ,  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  CCW a p p l i c a n t s '  a t t i t u d e s ,  
e x p e r i e n c e s ,  a n d  e x p e c t a t i o n s  r e g a r d i n g  f i r e a r m s  o w n e r s h ip ,  
CCW s, a n d  c r im e ,  w o u ld  p r o v i d e  i n s i g h t  i n  e x p l a i n i n g  a n y  
p o s s i b l e  im p a c t  m o re  CCWs m ay h a v e  o n  c r im e  i n  L a s  V e g a s .
A total of 150 of these surveys were distributed between 
October 1 and November 29, 1996 to four different randomly 
selected CCW instructors, who had agreed to administer 
them to their CCW students upon successfully completing 
their courses. These CCW classes varied somewhat depending 
on the particular instructor, but generally consisted of 
between 6-12 students, with the classes being held once 
or twice a month depending on enrollment. The instructors 
subsequently collected a total of 101 surveys in various 
stages of completion, and held them for me to collect and 
eventually analyze for results.
A copy of the survey's May 23rd "approval letter", the 
survey itself, and its results appears in the "Appendixes". 
Analysis of the survey results is covered in Chapter 7.
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
In selecting cities to serve as the 24 "shall issue" 
control cities to Las Vegas for the first phase of analysis, 
cities from all "shall issue" states in the country were 
considered. Currently, 31 states issue CCWs under more
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lenient "shall issue" laws (see "Appendixes" for a complete 
list), however Kentucky, Louisiana, South Carolina, and 
Texas have only been "shall issue since 1996. As the 
latest U.C.R. data available is 1995, these four states 
had to be eliminated from inclusion. New Hampshire, 
Alabama, Washington, and Connecticut adopted "shall issue" 
CCW laws relatively early (1923, 1936, 1961, and 1968 
respectively), and as such, seemed inconsistent with the 
other "shall issue" states who revised their CCW criteria 
in the 1980s and 1990s. Because of this, cities from these 
states were also not included in the analysis. Vermont 
was an anomaly, never having required any type of permit 
for its residents to legally carry a weapon concealed.
A s a  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s ,  V e rm o n t d i d  n o t  h a v e  a  p r e  o r  p o s t-C C W  
p e r i o d  t o  c o m p a r e ,  a n d  w as e x c lu d e d  f o r  a n a l y s i s .  F i n a l l y ,  
Id a h o  a n d  V i r g i n i a ,  t e c h n i c a l l y  " s h a l l  i s s u e "  s in c e  1990 
a n d  1988 r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a l s o  h a d  t o  b e  e l i m i n a t e d  f o r  
a n a l y s i s .  D u e  t o  l o c a l  l e g i s l a t i v e  c h a l l e n g e s  r e g a r d i n g  
t h e  s c o p e  o f  t h e s e  s t a t e s '  " s h a l l  i s s u e "  la w s ,  b o t h  h a d  
t o  r e v i s e  a n d  r e w o r d  t h e i r  " s h a l l  i s s u e "  la w s  i n  1995, 
a n d  a  s t a r t i n g  y e a r  f o r  a n a l y s i s  o f  CCWs e f f e c t s  w as  t o o  
d i f f i c u l t  t o  a s s e s s .
Thus, 19 "shall issue" states besides Nevada remained. 
These 19 states provided a source for selection of the 
24 control cities for the first phase analysis. At least
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one city was selected from each of these 19 states. The 
basis for each city's selection was that it be a major 
urban city for that state, with an economy somewhat 
dependent on tourism.
The selected 24 control cities, and the date their 
individual state adopted "shall issue" criteria were; 
Anchorage, Alaska (1994), Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona 
(1994), Little Rock, Arkansas (1995), Fort Lauderdale, 
Jacksonville and Orlando, Florida (1987), Atlanta and 
Columbus, Georgia (1989), Indianapolis, Indiana (1980), 
Portland, Maine (1985), Jackson, Mississippi (1990), 
Billings, Montana (1991), Charlotte, North Carolina (1995), 
Fargo, North Dakota (1985), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma (1995), 
Portland, Oregon (1990), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (1989), 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota (1986), Nashville and Memphis, 
Tennessee (1994), Salt Lake City, Utah (1995), Wheeling, 
West Virginia (1989) and Cheyenne, Wyoming (1994).
From this initial analysis of violent crime rate 
averages involving 24 control cities ̂ five cities were 
subsequently selected for the more in depth annual crime 
rate analysis (homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, 
burglary and motor vehicle theft) along with Las Vegas. 
These cities' selection was based on a number of 
characteristics.
First, all five cities had to have at least two years
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of post-CCW U.C.R. data available. Only one year of 
post-CCW data may be too short of a period to really detect 
any possible effect, since (1) the CCW law may have been 
enacted late in the initial adoption year, (2) there may 
have been a "lag" period following adoption before any 
change occurred, or (3) any one year may have been just 
a "blip" that was inconsistent within a more meaningful 
four or five year crime rate trend. It should be noted 
that while Las Vegas adopted "shall issue" criteria late 
in 1995 (October), almost half of its current CCWs had 
been issued earlier that year, due to a more lenient "may 
issue" criteria adopted by new incoming Sheriff Jerry 
Keller (Vogel 1995). In short the analysis of Las Vegas 
is based on one full year of data.
Second, all five cities selected had to have complete 
U.C.R. data available for all years analyzed. Florida 
for example, did not report U.C.R. data for 19 88. As this 
analysis required more precision due to its design 
consisting of annual crime rates (as opposed to averages) 
being examined for a decrease or increase as a result of 
adopting "shall issue" laws, extrapolating missing U.C.R. 
data would have been inappropriate.
If the first two characteristics were met, the third 
through fifth characteristics all had to do with "matching 
up" with Las Vegas if possible. Specifically, the
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remaining five cities were to be similar in size, urban 
development, and to have had in part, a "tourism" economy. 
This was important as crime rates can often vary depending 
on the size of the community, whether it is rural or urban, 
or its local economy (see Table 1).
T h e  f i v e  " s h a l l  i s s u e "  c o n t r o l  c i t i e s  s e l e c t e d  f o r  t h i s  
m o re  i n  d e p t h ,  s e c o n d  s t a g e  o f  a n a l y s i s  w e r e :  P o r t l a n d  
( O r e g o n ) ,  N a s h v i l l e ,  A t l a n t a ,  J a c k s o n  ( M i s s i s s i p p i ) ,  a n d  
P h o e n ix .
MEASUREMENT OF CONCEPTS
The general U.C.R. category of "violent crime" was used 
for the first phase of analysis, while the individual 
violent crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault were used for the more detailed second phase of 
analysis. These U.C.R. crime categories were selected 
as measurements of CCWs' possible effects, as these crimes 
can and do occur in open public places, where real or 
perceived armed CCW citizens may interact. Tardiff,
Marzuk and Leon (1995) found the "streets" and "other 
outdoor places" to be the most frequent places of 
occurrence for homicides (49.5%). Miethe and Meier 
(1994) found that among violent crimes committed by 
strangers of the victim, public streets were the most 
dangerous location, with approximately half of all rapes.
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robberies, and assaults occurring there.
While these violent crimes can also occur in residential 
settings, the use of a legally owned firearm in such a 
setting by a CCW citizen has no bearing on the CCW permit, 
as the permit's only function is to allow its owner to 
travel armed beyond his/her premises to most public places.
The first phase of analysis involving Las Vegas and 
the 24 other "shall issue" cities was designed to be a 
"quick general overview" of what effect more CCWs would 
have on violent crime rates. In this analysis, a five 
year pre-CCW violent crime rate average for each city was 
calculated from annual U.C.R data to be compared to a 
corresponding post-CCW violent crime rate average.
The second phase of analysis required more precise 
levels of measurement, and therefore the five "shall issue" 
cities were selected to match Las Vegas' size, urban and 
economic characteristics. Each city's annual rate for 
each studied violent crime (homicide, rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault) were examined over a multi-year period. 
Five years of pre-CCW annual rates were compared with one 
to five years (depending on the particular city) of 
post-CCW rates for each city, to see if a trend of a crime 
increasing or decreasing had occurred in a city after 
adopting "shall issue" CCW criteria, and to see if that 
trend had existed before the adoption year (i.e. possibly
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independent of the new CCW law).
The property crimes of burglary and motor vehicle theft 
were also examined for Las Vegas and the five selected 
control cities in a similar manner during this second phase 
of analysis. This was done to see if displacement from 
any of the selected violent crimes had occurred, as found 
by Lott and Mustard (1997).
In all phases of analysis, U.C.R- data for each 
specified city were used, not the municipal statistical 
area (M.S.A.). This was done to try to obtain as accurate 
of an evaluation of a city as possible.
LIMITATIONS
Limitations to both phases of the U.C.R. analysis 
includes having only one year of "post-CCW" data available 
for Las Vegas and a number of the control cities used.
As stated earlier, data based on only a one-year period 
may be highly volatile and an unstable estimate of post- 
CCW trends.
Another limitation of this U.C.R. analysis is the 
reliance on the U.C.R.s themselves. U.C.R.s have the 
limitations of consisting of only crimes that are reported 
to the police, not necessarily all the crimes committed. 
Additionally, changes in a city's judicial or police 
policies or personnel can inflate or deflate a particular 
crime as reported in the U.C.R., whether more or less of
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these crimes actually occurred. Finally, cities and states 
submit their annual crime data on a voluntary basis for 
publication in the U.C.R.s., and as such, data is sometimes 
unavailable for some cities in certain years due to their 
decision not to participate that particular year/years.
This U.C.R. limitation may have affected the estimated 
levels of crime when averaging the crime rates of the 
control cities.
Limitations to the CCW survey included having obtained 
the cooperation of only four CCW instructors. Six had 
been asked to participate. The location of the 
participating classrooms were Northeast Las Vegas,
Southeast Las Vegas, and Henderson. Ideally, it would 
have been desirable to have also obtained data from some 
CCW classes in West Las Vegas to insure a possibly more 
representative sampling of completed surveys. This is 
based on the assumption that CCW students attend classes 
closest to their homes, and these non-represented areas 
of town may have a different socioeconomic composition 
that could result in different attitudes and experiences 
towards crime and CCWs.
ANALYSIS PLAN
In examining the possible effects of more CCWs in Las 
Vegas during the first phase of analysis, pre and post
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5 5 -
multi-year averages of violent crime rates based on U.C.R. 
data were compared along with the 24 pre and post-CCW 
violent crime rate averages of 24 "shall issue" control 
cities. This information is presented in Table 2- An 
increase in violent crime rates after adopting "shall 
issue" CCW criteria was noted in the "Rate Change" column, 
with a "+" preceding the noted increase. A decrease in 
violent crime rates after adoption of the "shall issue" 
criteria was noted with a preceding the noted decrease.
A "Rate Percentage Change" column was similarly 
constructed in this same table.
* * * INSERT TABLE 2 HERE * * *
In the second, more detailed phase of analysis. Las 
Vegas and five matched control "shall issue" cities were 
examined over a period of years for the individual crimes 
of homicide, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, 
and motor vehicle theft. Annual U.C.R. crime rates for 
all six cities were plotted on a graph for each specific 
crime (one graph for homicide, one graph for rape, etc.). 
The "Y" axis of these graphs measured the rate per 100,000 
population for a particular offense. The "X" axis of these 
graphs included the years of data, starting five years 
prior to each city's adoption of "shall issue" legislation, 
and ending five years afterwards (or one and two years 
respectively for the newer "shall issue" cities of Las
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Vegas, and Phoenix and Nashville) .
In effect, these graphs would show any possible upward 
(crime increasing), or downward (crime decreasing) trends 
in crime rates prior to and after a city adopting more 
lenient "shall issue" CCW legislation. Accompanying each 
of these graphs is a table which lists the actual crime 
rates used in each particular graph. These graphs and 
tables are presented as Graphs 1 through 6, and Tables 
3 through 8.
* * * INSERT GRAPHS 1-6 AND TABLES 3-8 HERE * * * 
Finally, any effect noted from these two phases of 
analysis will have to be explained The CCW survey 
previously administered will hopefully provide some 
explanations for any of these findings.
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CHAPTER 6 
O.C.R. ANALYSIS RESULTS
In comparing Las Vegas' violent crime rate averages 
before and after adopting "shall issue" CCW criteria, it 
can be seen that there was an average increase of 22% 
following adoption of the "shall issue" law (see Table 
2). An increase in average violent crime rates following 
adoption of more lenient CCW standards was also found in 
16 of the 24 control cities. Only five of the control 
cities had a decrease following adoption of the "shall 
issue" laws, and three cities had no real change (two were 
plus one percent, and one was minus two percent).
The more detailed analysis of Las Vegas and the five 
matched control cities (Graphs 1-6 and Tables 3-8) for 
the crimes of homicide, rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault produced mixed results. In analyzing these graphs, 
caution was exercised in examining a crime rate trend 
occurring prior to each city adopting its "shall issue" 
criteria (i.e. an increase or decrease during years "-5" 
through "-1") as this could have influenced a post-CCW 
(years "0" through "+5") crime rate trend more than the
57
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CCW law itself.
In Las Vegas, homicide and robbery rates post-CCW seemed 
extensions of their pre-CCW crime rate years, and as such, 
no effects were attributable to the new CCW law. However, 
rape and aggravated assault rates appears to have "leveled 
off" during the CCW year from increasing trends beginning 
two years previously (years "-1" and "-2"). It should 
be noted, however, that no crime rates in Las Vegas 
increased or decreased more than 10% over the previous 
(non-CCW) year. No effect was noted in the displacement 
crimes of burglary and motor vehicle theft in Las Vegas.
No consistent pattern was noted in comparing the control 
cities. Phoenix showed a decrease in homicide, and no 
effect in any of the other crimes. Nashville showed a 
decrease in aggravated assault, and no effect for any of 
the other crimes. Portland showed an increase in 
aggravated assault, and no effect in the remaining crimes. 
Jackson showed an increase in all crimes except burglary. 
Atlanta showed a decrease in all crimes except aggravated 
assault, and these decreases typically started a year after 
adopting "shall issue" status (year "+1"). In short, three 
of the control cities showed little effect from adopting 
more lenient CCWs standards, while one control city showed 
mostly crime rate increases and another city showed mostly 
crime rate decreases.
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CHAPTER 7
CCW SURVEY AND RESULTS
I n  a n a l y z i n g  t h e  r e s u l t s  f r o m  t h e  a d m in is t e r e d  CCW 
s u r v e y ,  a  p r o f i l e  o f  N e v a d a 's  CCW a p p l i c a n t s  c a n  b e  
d e r i v e d .  (T h e  c o m p le te  s u r v e y  a n d  i t s  r e s u l t s  a p p e a r s  
i n  t h e  " A p p e n d ix e s "  s e c t i o n . )
The "typical" CCW applicant from this survey was white 
(85%), male (80%), married (705%), between 31 and 60 years 
of age (82%), had a 1995 income between $30-69,999 (65%), 
and had some college, or a college degree (88%). 11% had
personally been a victim of a violent crime, and 
approximately half of all those responding knew someone 
who had been a violent crime victim.
Most CCWs applicants surveyed perceived violent crime 
as growing, with no definite control of this problem coming 
from local law enforcement. Specifically, almost three 
quarters of all those responding felt violent crimes had 
increased over the last three years in Las Vegas, and will 
continue to do so. Only 7% felt local law enforcement 
would be "very effective" in controlling these crimes (50% 
responded "somewhat effective, and 25% responded "not
59
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effective at all").
Conversely, most CCW applicants in this survey felt 
obtaining a CCW and being able to be armed in public was 
a viable response to this growing violent crime problem. 
Specifically, all (100%) of those responding included 
"self-defense" as one of the reasons for owning a firearm, 
and 95% mentioned "security" as one of the reasons for 
applying for a CCW. Almost three quarters (74%) plan on 
carrying a handgun on themselves on a daily basis, and 
87% plan on practicing with it on a monthly basis. Almost 
two thirds (64%) felt that Nevada's CCW laws "will stop 
local criminals from attempting violent crimes for fear 
of being shot", and 94% felt that the average armed CCW 
citizen would be either "very effective" or "somewhat 
effective" in defending him/herself if involved in a 
violent crime.
While the majority of Nevada CCW applicants may feel 
that obtaining a CCW is a rational response to crime, and 
provides a feeling of safety or security, this may not 
necessarily be a feeling shared by others in the community. 
Hemenway, Solnick and Azrael (1995) found that 85% of 
non-gun owners would feel less safe if more people in their 
community acquired guns, while only 8% would feel more 
safe, and 6% would feel the same. Among gun owners, 41% 
would feel less safe, 40% more safe, and 19% would feel
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the same. Among all people surveyed, 71% would feel less 
safe, 19% would feel more safe, and 10% would feel the 
same.
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CHAPTER 8
DISCUSSION
The results from the first phase of analysis for Las 
Vegas (Table 2) and the second phase (Graphs 1-6 and Tables 
3-8) seem in conflict with each other, with the first 
phase finding Las Vegas' violent crime rate average to 
have increased 22% following adoption of "shall issue"
CCW criteria, and the second phase finding decreases in 
the violent crimes rates of rape and aggravated assault 
and no effect on any of the other violent crimes following 
adoption of the new CCW laws. A possible explanation for 
this discrepancy may lie with the use of mathematical 
averages in comparing pre and post-CCW effects of analysis 
in Table 2.
Specifically, averaging five years of annual pre-CCW 
rates does not show if there was a increasing trend in 
annual violent crime rates during this period that "carried 
over" into the post-CCW period for Las Vegas. Upon 
initial analysis of Table 2, Las Vegas shows a violent 
crime rate average of 1200 per 100,000 after adopting 
"shall issue" CCW standards in 1995. The average violent
62
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crime rate pre-CCW for Las Vegas was 935 per 100,000, based 
on a five years average of the annual violent crime rates 
preceding 1995. However, these five years from 1990 to 
1994 show violent crime rates to have been progressively 
increasing during those years; 732 in 1990, 862 in 1991,
888 in 1992, 940 in 1993, and 1251 in 1994. Thus, Las 
Vegas' post-CCW rate is actually a decrease (from the five 
preceding years of pre-CCW violent crime increase). This 
seems more consistent with the second phase of analysis, 
which showed Las Vegas' rates of rape and aggravated 
assault leveling off from previous pre-CCW trends of 
increase.
Fifteen of the 24 control cities in Table 2 also seem 
to have had their post-CCW averages influenced by a pre-CCW 
trend of violent crime increase or decrease. Excluding 
the cities of Oklahoma City, Phoenix, and Salt Lake City 
which had only a 1-2% change in their pre and post-CCW 
averages, and Indianapolis which had too many years of 
missing U.C.R. data to assess a pre-CCW trend, only six 
cities showed their violent crime rate averages to have 
changed without a pre-existing violent crime rate 
trend. These six cities were; Columbus, Fort Lauderdale, 
Jackson, Pittsburgh, Portland, Maine (all showed an 
increase following adoption of "shall issue") and Little 
Rock (which showed a decrease).
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A supplemental analysis of the violent crime rate 
averages was conducted for Las Vegas and all 24 control 
cities to assess how the compilation of averages may have 
affected the results (see Table 9). Specifically, the 
pre-CCW violent crime rate averages used in Table 2 were 
based on the annual violent crime rates for each city in 
the years "-1" through "-5", and the post-CCW violent crime 
rate averages used in Table 2 were based on the annual 
violent crime rates for each city in the years "+1" through 
"+5", while Table 9 shows the crime rate for each year 
used to obtain these pre and post-CCW averages. Thus,
Table 9 can show whether changes were occurring in a city's 
crime rate prior to its CCW law taking effect.
* * * INSERT TABLE 9 HERE * * *
While the analysis thus far reveals that rape and 
aggravated assault rates decreased, and the other crime 
rates were unaffected as a possible result of more lenient 
CCW laws in Las Vegas in 19 95 (its first and only "shall 
issue" year U.C.R. data was available for), the question 
remains, "What happened to crime rates in non-CCW ("may 
issue") cities during 1995?" In other words, is it 
possible that Las Vegas' crime rate changes or no changes 
in 1995 were a result of a non-CCW variable that can be 
seen in a city without "shall issue" CCW laws in 1995.
To examine this possibility, separate analysis by
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specific crimes were conducted in Las Vegas and the "may 
issue" control cities of Denver, San Antonio, New Orleans, 
Sacramento, and San Francisco. These "may issue" control 
cities were selected on essentially the same criteria as 
the "shall issue" control cities. In effect, the "may 
issue" control cities had no missing annual U.C.R. data, 
and had similarities to Las Vegas regarding size, urban 
development, and tourism (see Table 1).
These tables and graphs examined annual crime rates 
over a ten year period of 1985 through 1995, as obviously 
the "may issue" control cities did not have a pre or post- 
CCW period. Instead, the analysis here is to see if Las 
Vegas' crime rates followed a similar trend to non-CCW/"may 
issue" cities.
* * * INSERT GRAPHS 7-12 AND TABLES 10-15 HERE * * *
As revealed in Graphs 7 through 12 and Tables 10 through 
15, Las Vegas' crime rates generally follow the ten year 
trends of three to four of the control cities, especially 
in 1995 (Las Vegas' "shall issue" year). Hence, the 
analysis indicates that the decrease in rape and aggravated 
assault rates in Las Vegas during the first year of the 
changes in CCW criteria are similar to trends in the 
majority of the other (non-CCW) cities in 1995, and 
therefore, are not attributable to changes in the CCW 
standards made in 1995.
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CHAPTER 9
CONCLUSIONS
From the literature review in Chapter 3, we have seen 
that theories, empirical studies, and statistics abound 
in both supporting and not supporting more lenient CCW 
laws and its foundation, private firearm ownership.
Some of the published research and literature, however, 
seems to have reached a "compromise" from these two 
different sides. That is, they have concluded that while 
more lenient CCWs (and for that matter, less firearm 
restrictions in general for law abiding citizens) can not 
be shown to reduce crime, they by the same token can not 
be shown to directly contribute to crime either. It is 
this viewpoint that my own Las Vegas CCW U.C.R. analysis 
supports.
In analyzing U.C.R. data for Las Vegas, each detected 
change in crime possibly attributable to adopting "shall 
issue" CCW standards in 1995, was subsequently rejected 
by a closer, different analysis. The net effect was that 
no increase or decrease in crime rates could be firmly 
seen as a result of more lenient CCWs in Las Vegas.
66
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The lack of any effect on crime rates could be a result 
of Las Vegas having only relaxed its CCW standards since 
1995, as the cities of Atlanta, Georgia ("shall issue" 
since 1989) and Jackson, Mississippi ("shall issue" since 
1990) both show more definite effects of adopting these 
laws. Atlanta showed general decreases, or the leveling 
off of increasing crime trends, usually beginning in its 
second year of "shall issue" analysis. Jackson on the 
other hand, generally showed increases in crime rates, 
usually immediately after adopting its "shall issue" CCW 
criteria.
Besides being relatively new, with only one year of 
"shall issue" CCW data to analyze, the lack of a more 
attributable effect on crime from CCWs in Las Vegas could 
be a result of a number of other factors. First, with 
less than one percent of Las Vegas' one million residents 
having a CCW, perhaps there simply are not enough people 
with CCWs to make any real impact, either in decreasing 
or increasing crime.
Second, while 74% of the applicants from the CCW 
survey plan on being armed on a daily basis, it can be 
questioned whether this many actually will do so. Given 
the bulk, size and inconvenience of carrying a handgun 
concealed, many CCW owners may be unarmed when actually 
confronted by an antagonist.
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Third, perhaps those who typically obtain CCWs are also 
less likely to be victims of violent crimes. Specifically, 
white, male, middle aged, middle income, college educated 
people (the profile generated from the CCW survey) may 
be less likely to be victimized than women or those of 
a lower socioeconomic group.
Fourth, perhaps a lack of "publicity" has slowed a more 
dramatic effect that could have resulted in Las Vegas with 
its new law. The previously mentioned defensive firearm 
training program for females in Orlando, Florida was highly 
publicized by its local media, and rape did decline 
significantly (60-90%), with possible displacement.
A fifth possible explanation is that the many changes 
that regularly occur within any community (i.e. changes 
in the size and focus of local law enforcement, changes 
in the judicial system and the focus and definition of 
different crimes, changes in the levels in gang activity, 
illegal drug sales and use, the economy, tourism, etc.), 
may simply overshadow the impact of CCW ownership on crime 
rates.
A final possible explanation, is that perhaps more CCWs 
do reduce violent crime rates (via acts of self-defense 
or deterrence), but at the same time, they also serve as 
a stimulus ("weapons effect") to initiate more crime.
The net result would be no measurable effect.
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If CCWs have had for the most part, no conclusive 
effects on crime, what do they provide for their owners 
or applicants? From the CCW survey presented in Chapter 
7, the answer seems to be a "sense of security".
Stated simply, CCW applicants feel safer by obtaining the 
right to be legally armed in public.
These conclusions do not necessarily imply that this 
CCW provided "sense of security" is a "false sense of 
security". In fact, Wright (1995) points out that the 
fear of crime or victimization is not only based on reality 
in our society, but is equally important, a very real 
feeling to many people. Firearm ownership and CCWs may 
help alleviate this fear, just as many less "controversial" 
methods may do (home security alarm systems, guard dogs, 
pepper sprays, etc.). Wright philosophically asks, "Does 
a society that is manifestly incapable of protecting its 
citizens from crime and predation really have the right 
or moral authority to tell people what they may or may 
not do to protect themselves? (1995:65)". This question 
may have special significance when remembering that the 
incidence of CCW owners "misusing" their legally carried 
handgun to commit a crime is extremely rare.
Thus for many people, CCWs and private firearm 
ownership may provide a reduction in the fear of crime 
that is no longer obtainable from the more formal social
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controls of the criminal justice system. Applicable to 
this conclusion, are the previously mentioned CCW survey 
results and the previously mentioned findings of Smith 
and Uchida (1988), that firearm ownership (and thus 
perhaps CCWs) is a form of "self-help" based on perceived 
vulnerability to crime, and is inversely related to a 
perceived ineffectiveness of the police. Also applicable 
is the previously mentioned work of Young, McDowall and 
Loftin (1987) that found firearm ownership inversely 
related to the owners' confidence in the criminal 
justice system. However, if this feeling of more security 
benefits the psyche of the gun or CCW owner against 
crime, it may have to be weighed against the feelings of 
less security experienced by other citizens in the 
community to them (Hemenway et al 1995).
In conclusion, this paper is in support of the 
null hypothesis that, "CCWs have no measurable effect on 
crime rates". More research addressing the policy 
implications of Nevada's "shall issue" law in Las Vegas 
should be undertaken in the future.
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TABLE 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTROL CITIES
7 2
(1990) TOTAL HOUSING % ECONOMY
CITY POPULATION UNITS SERVICE
Las Vegas 258,204 109,670 48.57%
Nashville 488,374 219,521 37.07%
Portland, OR 438,002 198,319 37.04%
Jackson 395,396 79,352 39.59%
Atlanta 393,929 182,754 39.77%
Phoenix 983,403 422,036 33.27%
Denver 467,610 239,636 39.34%
San Antonio 935,393 327,403 36.82%
New Orleans 496,938 225,573 44.66%
San Francisco 723,959 328,471 41.91%
Sacramento 369,365 153,362 34.05%
All data from Facts About Cities by Allan Carpenter, 1996
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TABLE 2
VIOLENT CRIME RATE AVERAGES PER 100,000









Las Vegas 935 1200 + 265 + 22%
Anchorage 701 984 + 283 + 29%
Atlanta 2904 3984 + 1 080 + 27%
Billings 158 99 -59 -37%
Charlotte 2088 1696 -392 -1 9%
Cheyenne 184 201 + 17 + 08%
Columbus 449 530 + 81 + 1 5%
Fargo 126 99 -27 -21%
Ft Lauderdale 1202 1497 + 295 + 20%
Indianaplois 813 875 + 62 + 07%
Jackson 71 7 1288 + 571 + 44%
Jacksonville 1 095 1 638 + 543 + 33%
Little Rock 2846 2046 -800 -28%
Memphis 1 466 1 669 + 203 + 12%
Nashville 1481 1 794 + 313 + 1 7%
Oklahoma City 1 286 1293 + 07 + 01%
Orlando 1 91 4 2284 + 370 + 1 6%
Phoenix 1 065 1 074 + 09 + 01 %
Pittsburgh 1106 1222 + 1 1 6 + 09%
Portland, ME 803 900 + 97 + 1 1 %
Portland, OR 2222 1837 -385 -1 7%
Salt Lake City 802 782 -20 -02%
Sioux Falls 190 258 + 68 + 26%
Tucson 973 11 56 + 1 83 + 16%
Wheeling 271 432 + 1 61 + 37%
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GRAPH 1
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"NA" Nashville 
"PO" Portland
(1995) "JA" Jackson (1990)
(1994) "AT" Atlanta (1989)
(1990) "PH" Phoenix (1994)
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TABLE 3
HOMICIDE PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES
7 S
CCW YEAR LV NA PO JA AT PH
+ 5 09.4 47.1 46.4
+ 4 10.8 45.4 50.3
+ 3 12.8 41 .9 48.2
+ 2 10.0 31 .5 50.9
+ 1 20.1 11.8 37.3 58.6 19.7
0 14.9 14.0 07.5 22.4 57.7 21 .5
-1 14.0 19.9 08.9 23.8 48.8 15.2
-2 12.7 17.5 11.6 23.2 48.1 13.6
-3 14.6 17.3 16.9 25.0 41 .7 12.9
-4 15.7 13.4 12.5 15.6 33.2 13.0
-5 12.8 13.8 11.7 18.1 30.5 13.4
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "JA" Jackson (1990)
"NA" Nashville (1994) "AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PO" Portland (1990) "PH" Phoenix (1994)
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GRAPH 2
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"LV" Las Vegas (1995) 
"NA" Nashville (1994) 
"PO" Portland (1990)
"JA" Jackson (1990) 
"AT" Atlanta (1989) 
"PH" Phoenix (1994)
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TABLE 4
RAPE PER 100,000 IN "SHALL ISSUE*
CITIES
77-
CCW YEAR LV NA PO JA AT PH
+ 5 92.9 95.3 102.6
4-4 86.4 103.4 122.1
4-3 105.3 87.3 1 52.6
4-2 106.9 105.0 158.3
4-1 93.0 103.2 95.9 176.4 37.9
0 72.0 97.4 97.0 93.6 162.0 40.7
-1 76-3 112.3 97.5 89.4 162.0 42.7
-2 60.6 96.7 96.0 73.9 147.9 47.6
-3 57.9 101.3 104.1 53.7 152.8 48.2
-4 66.0 110.7 118.9 54.5 1 56.6 52.1
-5 60.2 95.3 127.6 55.2 142.7 42.3
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "JA" Jackson (1990)
"NA" Nashville (1994) "AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PO" Portland (1990) "PH" Phoenix (1994)
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TABLE 5
ROBBERY PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES
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CCW YEAR LV NA PO JA AT PH
+ 5 501 753 1 299
+ 4 506 953 1 500
+ 3 507 759 1417
+ 2 586 625 1607
+ 1 51 1 606 663 1550 340
0 468 509 581 397 1594 321
-1 506 527 626 321 1 342 331
-2 498 51 8 937 305 1186 314
-3 532 522 938 1 95 121 8 346
-4 486 433 1 055 203 1099 344
-5 362 321 954 21 0 910 278
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "JA" Jackson (1990)
"NA" Nashville (1994) "AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PO" Portland (1990) "PH" Phoenix (1994)
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TABLE 6
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT PER 100,000
IN "SHALL ISSUE" CITIES
81
CCW YEAR LV NA PO JA AT PH
+ 5 1 323 471 21 23
+ 4 1 299 580 2368
+ 3 1 232 51 4 2241
+ 2 1 1 28 526 2225
+ 1 11 67 1 085 408 2300 670
0 646 11 78 1 1 06 351 21 38 698
-1 656 1 127 1 1 58 280 2023 757
-2 444 996 1 1 96 397 1 61 6 71 6
-3 284 934 1 1 83 429 1 541 698
-4 294 821 1 203 428 1 373 675
-5 297 61 3 1 255 382 1 293 567
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "JA" Jackson (1990)
"NA" Nashville (1994) "AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PO" Portland (1990) "PH" Phoenix (1994)
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GRAPH 5


















1 0 0 0
500
-3 -2 1 +  1 + 2 + 5-5 -4 0 + 3 + 4
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) 
"NA" Nashville (1994) 
"PO" Portland (1990)
"JA" Jackson (1990) 
"AT" Atlanta (1989) 
"PH" Phoenix (1994)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
TABLE 7
BURGLARY PER 100,000 IN
"SHALL ISSUE" CITIES
83
CCW YEAR LV NA PO JA AT PH
+ 5 1 704 2796 2951
+ 1 1 728 3680 3268
+ 3 1 725 3567 3180
4-2 1912 3747 3439
4-1 1573 211 3 4384 3939 1 930
0 1 540 1 600 2050 3798 4033 1 984
-1 1 549 1 781 2908 2850 3496 1 984
-2 1 363 1 989 3930 2665 3472 2032
-3 1 524 2034 3885 2540 301 9 2432
-4 1 637 1 780 4678 2023 2795 251 0
-5 1 651 1 608 4665 1 889 2441 2443
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "JA" Jackson (1990)
"NA" Nashville (1994) "AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PO" Portland (1990) "PH" Phoenix (1994)
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"PO" Portland i
1995) "JA" Jackson (1990)
1 994) "AT" Atlanta (1989)
990) "PH" Phoenix (1994)
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TABLE 8
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT PER 100,000 
IN "SHALL ISSDE" CITIES
85
CCW YEAR LV NA PO JA AT PH
+ 5 1 987 2079 2085
+ 4 2061 2473 2288
+ 3 1 860 2045 2057
+ 2 1 725 2031 2732
+ 1 1 550 1 425 1 686 2832 2133
0 1 007 1146 1 328 789 2703 1 920
-1 1 028 921 1 636 536 2093 1498
-2 1 038 998 21 04 41 8 1 747 1498
-3 1 091 757 1 320 357 1363 1 667
-4 997 694 1 056 31 9 993 1782
-5 852 532 921 299 71 9 1 349
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "JA" Jackson (1990)
"NA" Nashville (1994) "AT" Atlanta (1989)
"PO" Portland (1990) "PH" Phoenix (1994)
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TABLE 9
SOB-ANALYSIS OF TABLE 2 DATA 
VIOLENT CRIME PER 100,000
"Shall Issue" since 1995
CCW Las Oklahoma Salt Little
Year Vegas Charlotte City Lake City Rock
1 1 200 1 696 1 293 782 2046
-1 1 251 1 727 1 403 755 2954
-2 940 2300 1 41 7 823 3290
-3 888 1932 1 400 783 2952
-4 862 21 76 1 128 803 2981
-5 732 2303 1 082 847 2054
"Shall Issue" since 1994
CCW
Year Anchorage Phoenix Tucson Nashville Memphis Cheyenne
2 990 1 068 1206 1790 1 769 1 83
1 977 1 080 1106 1798 1 568 21 8
-1 883 1 1 46 1023 1784 1 634 204
-2 81 6 1 091 1021 1628 1 553 231
-3 71 2 1 1 06 939 1575 1 422 1 93
-4 588 1 084 908 1378 1 488 11 6
-5 506 900 N/R 1038 1 233 1 76
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"Shall Issue" since 1990
ccw Jackson, Portland t
Year Mississippi Oregon
5 1682 1 902
4 1 402 1 856
3 1 287 1831
2 1204 1 805
1 864 1 792





"Shall Issue" since 1 989
CCW
Year Atlanta Columbus Pittsburgh Wheeling
5 3983 61 1 1 21 6 529
4 3859 460 1202 443
3 4041 51 0 11 53 397
2 4085 578 1323 436
1 3951 489 1216 353
-1 3576 488 1 063 334
-2 2999 381 1110 305
-3 2909 436 1170 259
-4 2662 491 1086 179
-5 2376 447 1 099 277
"Shall Issue" since 1 987
CCW Fort
Year Lauderdale Orlando Jacksonville
5 1421 N/R 1760
4 1625 2495 1 830
3 1 706 2087 1 443
2 N/R N/R N/R
1 1235 2270 1520
-1 1 275 2342 1298
-2 1439 2064 1215
-3 1189 1 698 1 069
-4 933 1 552 936
-5 11 75 1 91 3 955
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TABLE 10
HOMICIDE PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
CITIES & LAS VEGAS
9 0
YEAR LV DE SA NO SF SC
1995 14.9 16.0 14.2 74.5 13.4 15.2
1 994 14.0 15.8 15.9 85.8 12.3 15.9
1 993 12.7 14.8 22.3 80.3 17.5 22.0
1 992 14.6 19.3 22.5 55.2 15.6 11.7
1 991 15.7 18.4 21 .8 68.9 12.9 17.5
1 990 12.8 14.3 22.2 61 .2 14.0 11.6
1 989 12.5 11.1 17.7 47.5 09.7 12.7
1 988 10.6 13.8 15.3 42.4 12.2 20.0
1 987 09.8 15.5 18.9 37.3 13.4 23.5
1 986 16.2 17.6 18.4 34.9 15.2 21 .9
1 985 12.5 14.0 20.9 27.1 11.6 12.5
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TABLE 11
RAPE PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
CITIES & LAS VEGAS
92
YEAR LV DE SA NO SF SC
1 995 72.0 63.3 65.8 1 00.0 41 .2 42.0
1 994 76.3 71 .6 56.5 88.3 39.4 44.7
1 993 60.6 78.9 56.1 60.6 49.0 43.2
1992 57.9 88.7 63.3 56.8 52.6 61 .9
1 991 66.0 89.1 73.0 60.3 54.1 58.6
1 990 60.2 80.2 45.9 72.6 57.9 57.1
1 989 56.9 65.7 50.2 73.4 50.6 53.9
1 988 71 .0 73.9 57.2 74.9 60.1 55.2
1 987 64.0 78.7 92.3 65. 3 58.9 72.6
1 986 69.7 81 .8 91 .5 80.9 65.5 80.6







"NO" New Orleans 
"SF" San Francisco 
"sc" Sacramento
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GRAPH 9
ROBBERY PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
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TABLE 12
ROBBERY PER 100,000 IN "MAY
CITIES & LAS VEGAS
ISSUE'
YEAR LV DE SA NO SF SC
1 995 468 279 235 1 098 876 566
1 994 506 335 278 976 893 589
1 993 498 374 302 1 053 1 1 48 597
1 992 532 366 358 1 058 1 1 02 606
1 991 486 341 395 1 192 950 605
1 990 362 281 306 1 21 7 974 485
1 989 382 256 285 1 031 666 476
1 988 369 279 306 879 646 473
1 987 382 316 354 689 606 555
1 986 417 405 371 91 6 678 691
1 985 384 374 31 1 738 697 666
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "NO" New Orleans
"DE" Denver "SF" San Francisco
"SA" San Antonio "SC" Sacramento
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GRAPH 10
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT PER 100,000 IN
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TABLE 13
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT PER 100,000 IN
"MAY ISSUE" CITIES & LAS VEGAS
96
YEAR LV DE SA NO SF SC
1 995 646 503 203 960 546 515
1 994 656 498 293 737 51 6 557
1 993 444 586 302 845 600 592
1 992 284 602 289 81 2 651 540
1 991 294 601 302 869 629 61 8
1990 297 524 238 908 665 524
1 989 312 389 200 778 61 3 51 1
1 988 337 360 186 662 564 503
1 987 351 343 1 97 606 532 505
1 986 349 393 228 594 508 530
1 985 336 360 1 98 61 9 517 431
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "NO" New Orleans
"DE" Denver "SF" San Francisco
"SA" San Antonio "SC" Sacramento
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TABLE 14
BURGLARY PER 100,000 IN "MAY ISSUE"
CITIES & LAS VEGAS
98
YEAR LV DE SA NO SF SC
1 995 1 540 1 465 1396 21 01 965 21 29
1 994 1 549 1 51 8 1 642 2037 1 086 2074
1 993 1 363 1 831 1 81 3 2275 1 51 5 2089
1 992 1524 1 806 2258 21 72 1 576 1 907
1 991 1 637 1915 2609 2476 1 435 2056
1 990 1 651 1 997 2780 2742 1 467 1 886
1 989 1 682 2078 2998 2445 1 424 21 55
1 988 1 755 2306 2957 2290 1 346 2262
1 987 1 952 2690 3591 21 83 1 256 2653
1 986 1 960 331 3 3320 2050 1342 311 7
1 985 21 84 3208 2843 1 850 1 603 31 87
IILV" Las Vegas (1995) "NO" New OrleansI
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TABLE 15
MOTOR VEHICLE THEFT PER 100,000 IN
"MAY ISSUE" CITIES & LAS VEGAS
1 00
YEAR LV DE SA NO SF SC
1 995 1 007 1 036 842 201 8 11 23 21 24
1 994 1 028 1222 988 1 734 1 247 2271
1 993 1 038 1 51 6 1 1 97 1 942 1 501 2038
1 992 1 091 1 641 1 51 3 1 807 1 687 21 35
1 991 997 1213 1508 1 975 1 61 1 2004
1 990 852 1269 1 590 2443 1 569 1 773
1 989 854 1 138 1 607 21 70 1 288 1 940
1 988 809 994 1 41 1 1 799 1270 1 696
1 987 763 1 073 1 480 1 630 1 006 1 1 65
1 986 675 1273 925 1679 91 0 1 001
1 985 670 983 870 1 1 92 809 932
"LV" Las Vegas (1995) "NO" New Orleans
"DE" Denver "SF" San Francisco
"SA" San Antonio "SC" Sacramento
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New Hampshire 1923 
North Carolina 1995 




South Carolina 199 6
South Dakota 1986
Tennessee 1994
Texas 1995 (enacted 1996)
Utah 1995
Vermont (no license required) 
Virginia 1988 (revised 1995) 
Washington 19 61 
West Virginia 1989 
Wyoming 1994
included 1995)
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Dear CCW applicant;
Congratulations on successfully completing your CCW/handgun 
qualification course.
While CCWs have recently gained in popularity both 
nationally and in Nevada, little is known about the 
applicants and their attitudes towards these new laws.
As such, I am asking for your cooperation and participation 
in completing the following survey to more accurately gauge 
the opinions and attitudes of current Nevada CCW 
applicants.
Your honest and candid answers would be greatly 
appreciated, and are strictly voluntary and anonymous. 
Results of this survey will be presented to the criminal 
justice graduate department at UNLV as part of my Master's 
thesis.
Please return your completed survey to your CCW classroom 
instructor.
Thank you for your help on this project. If you have any 
questions regarding this survey or its results, I may be 
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The first set of questions concerns you and your CCW;
Q-1. Prior to considering obtaining your CCW, did you 
own a handgun?
No................  08 (08%)
Yes............... 93 (92%)
Total  101 (100%)
Q-2. Other than your CCW handgun, do you own any other 
firearms, including rifles and shotguns?
No................ 22 (22%)
Yes............... 79 (78%)
Total  101 (100%)














1 01 (100%)Total................................   
*"Other" responses include; freedom (1), work 
(4), competition (1), I love guns (1), instructor 
(1), defend against government (1), and 
heirloom ( 1 ) .
Q-4. Prior to completing your CCW/handgun defense
course, had you ever completed any other defensive
firearms courses?
No.......... .....  52 (52%)
Yes......... . .... 48 (48%)
Total.... . .... 100 (100%)
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0 - 5 , Do you plan on taking any additional 
defensive-firearms courses within the next year?
No................ 43 (43%)
Yes............... 57 (57%)
Total.........  1 00 ( 100%)
Q-6. Upon receiving your CCW, how often will you 
actually carry your handgun?
Almost every day............... 74 (74%)
Once or twice a week..........  12 (12%)
Once or twice a month.........  0 9 ( 09%)
A few times a year, or less.... 05 (05%)
Total.......................  1 00 (1 00%)
Q-7. Prior to obtaining your CCW, did you ever carry 
a handgun concealed in a public place?
Yes, almost every day..............  17 (17%)*
Yes, once or twice a week...........  07 (07%)
Yes, once or twice a month.......... 08 (08%)
Yes, a few times a year, or less.... 16 (16%)
No, never...........................  53 (52%)
Total  101 (100%)
*2 of these responses noted that they had 
been a police officer, or had a previous 
CCW while living in Florida.
0-8. Upon receiving your CCW, how often will you 
actually practice with your handgun?
At least once a week............... 35 (35%)
At least once a month............... 52 (51%)
A few times a year or less......... 14 (14%)
Total  101 (100%)
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Q-9. Prior to applying for your CCW, how often did you 
actually practice with your handgun?
At least once a week............... 27 (27%)
At least once a month..............  37 (38%)
A few times a year or less..........  35 (35%)
Total  99 ( 1 00%)
The next set of questions involves your experiences and 
thoughts on crime in Las Vegas, and CCWs.
Q-10. Have you been a victim of a violent or potentially 
violent crime (robbery, assault, etc.) within the 
last two years?
No...................  90 (89%)
Yes  11 (11%)
Total  101 (100%)
If "yes" to Q-10, was it reported to the police?
No....................  02 (18%)
Yes...................  09 (82%)
Total..............  11 (100%)
Q-11. Do you personally know someone who has been a
victim of a violent or potentially violent crime 
(robbery, assault, rape, etc.) within the last two 
years?
No...................  48 (47i%)
Yes..................  53 (52i%)
Total  101 (100%)
If "yes" to Q-11 , was it reported to the police?
No....................  03 (06%)
Yes...................  45 (94%)
Total..............  48 (100%)
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Q-12. Do you think the level of violent crimes (assault, 
robbery, rape) in Las Vegas has increased, 
decreased, or stayed the same over the last three 
years?
It has increased......... 72 (71%)
It has decreased......... 04 (04%)
It has stayed the same... 09 (09%)
Don't know............... 1 6 (16%)
Total................. 1 01 (100%)
Q-13. Do you think the level of violent crimes (assaults, 
robbery, rape) in Las Vegas will increase, 
decrease, or stay the same over the next three 
years?
It will increase......... 77 (77%)
It will decrease......... 05 (05%)
It will stay the same.... 08 (08%)
Don't know...............  10 (10%)
Total..................  100 (100%)
Q-14. How effective has local law enforcement been in
reducing these violent crimes in Las Vegas the past 
three years?
Very effective.......... 04 (04%)
Somewhat effective..... 53 (53%)
Not effective at all.... 27 (27%)
Don't know.............. 1 6 (16%)
Total................. 1 00 (100%)
Q-15. How effective do you think local law enforcement 
will be in reducing these violent crimes in Las 
Vegas in the next three years?
Very effective........ (07%)
Somewhat effective.... . . 50 (50%)
Not effective at al... . . 25 (25%)
Don't know............ . . 18 (18%)
Total............... (100%)
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Q-16. Do you think Nevada's CCW laws will stop local
criminals from attempting violent crimes for fear 
of being shot?
Yes.....................  64 (63^%)
No......................  24 (23i%)
Don't know.............. 13 (13%)
Total  101 (100%)
Q-1 7. How effective in defending himself/herself will 
the average armed CCW citizen be if actually 
involved in a violent crime?
V e r y  e f f e c t i v e ........................... 46 (45i%)
S o m e w h a t  e f f e c t i v e ................ 48 (47i%)
N o t  e f f e c t i v e  a t  a l l . . . . 00 (00%)
D o n ' t  k n o w ...................................... 07 (07%)
T o t a l ............................................... 101 (100%)
Q-18. What does receiving a CCW mean to you? Mark all 
that apply.
S e c u r i t y ................................ (100%)
C o n f i d e n c e ........................... (58%)
E m p o w e r m e n t ........................ (12%)
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y ............... ___  90 (95%)
A u t h o r i t y .............................. (07%)
O t h e r  ( s p e c i f y ) ............. ___  06 (06%)*
T o t a l ................................... ___  95 (100%)
*"Other" reponses include; deterrence 
(1), freedom (1), protection ( 2 ) ,  
legality (1), and exercise of my 
rights (1).
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Finally, a few questions about your background;
Q-19. Are you male or female?
Male  81 (80%)
Female.................. 20 (20%)
Total  101 (100%)
Q-20. How old are you?
Q-21




61 or older............. 06 (06%)
Total................. 99 (100%)
What is the highest level of education you 
completed?
Some high school....... 03 (03%)
High school graduate.... 11 (11%)
Vocational/trade school. 08 (08%)
Some college............ 48 (48%)
College graduate....... 21 (21%)
Advanced college degree. 09 (19%)
Total.................. 1 00 (100%)
Q-22. Which ethnic/racial group do you consider yourself?
White,
Black.
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Q-23. How many years have you lived in the Las Vegas area?
Less than 5 years........... 3 9 (39%)
5-10 years.................  12 (12%)
11-20 years................  25 (25%)
Over 20 years.............. 24 (24%)
Total....................  1 00 (1 00%)
Q-24. Are you currently married?
No........................  29 (29i%)
Yes.......................  69 (70i%)
Total  98 (1 00%)
If "yes", does your spouse have or is applying for 
a CCW?
No........................  34 (55%)
Yes.......................  28 (45%)
Total  62 (100%)
0-25. Which of the following broad categories best
represents your total family income before taxes 
in 1995?
Less than $10,000..... . . . 02 (02%)
$1 0,000 to $29, 999.... .. . 10 (11%)
$30,000 to $49, 999.... . . . 38 (42%)
$50,000 to $69,999.... . . . 21 (23%)
$70,000 to $99, 999.... . . . 12 (13%)
$100,000 or more...... 08 (09%)
Total................ . . . 91 (100%)
Thank you for taking the time to complete this survey. 
Your answers are valued and appreciated. PLEASE RETURN 
THIS COMPLETED SURVEY TO YOUR CCW CLASSROOM INSTRUCTOR.
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DATE: May 23, 1996
TO: Gary Yuen (CRJ)
M/S 5009 
-yi H-xFROM: ' . Sr. William E. Schulze, Director
/^Office of Sponsored. Programs (X13 57)iRE: Status of Human Subject Protocol Entitled:
"A Survey of Nevada Concealed Carry Weapons Permit 
Application"
OSP #104s0596-G33e
The protocol for the project referenced above has been reviewed by 
the Office of Sponsored Programs and it has been determined that it 
meets the criteria for exemption from full review by the UNLV human 
subjects Institutional Review Board. Except for any required 
conditions or modifications noted below, this protocol is approved 
for a period of one year from the date of this notification, and 
work on the project may proceed.
Should ■ the use of human subjects described in this protocol 
continue beyond a year from the date of this notification, it will 
be necessary to request an extension.
cc: T. Miethe (CRJ-50091
OSP File
Office of Sponsored Programs 
4505 Maryland Parkway • Box 451037 " Las Vegas. Nevada 89154-1037 
(702) 895-1357 •  FAX (702) 895-4242
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